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I. INTRODUCTION
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.'
So began Justice O'Connor for the plurality in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.2 Two years later, however, the promise of cer-
tainty in that opening line remains unrealized. The Court's decision in
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992). Throughout this Com-
ment, when we refer to "Casey" we refer to the Supreme Court's 1992 opinion in which the
Court articulated its undue burden standard. Ld.; see infra part ll.D. For the tortured
procedural history of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, see infra note 18.
2. Id
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Casey has produced neither clarity nor certainty in the often-emo-
tional abortion debate.
This Comment analyzes state and federal applications of Casey's
"undue burden" test in the privacy rights arena, and concludes that
the lower courts have failed to apply the test as intended by the Casey
plurality-when they have applied it at all. The cases are marked by
confusion about the applicable standard and uncertainty as to the
proper analysis. After reviewing the disarray among the cases, it be-
comes clear that the level of protection afforded a constitutional right
truly can be a product of what courts choose to do, not necessarily
what the Supreme Court directs.
An understanding of Casey is essential to make sense of opinions
applying Casey's constitutional analysis. Therefore, Part II analyzes
the Casey opinion in detail, interpreting the plurality's undue burden
test and examining its application to the abortion regulations in ques-
tion.3 Under the Court's undue burden test, the degree of impinge-
ment upon a protected liberty interest is weighed against the
justification for that impingement: The more legitimate the state's
purpose, the more burdensome its effects must be to render the stat-
ute unconstitutional.4
The Casey opinion was not, however, limited to the expression of
a new constitutional standard, the undue burden test, by which abor-
tion regulations were to be measured. The Court also suggested a
more fundamental alteration in constitutional analysis. Traditionally,
a plaintiff who brought a facial challenge must have shown that "no
set of circumstances" existed wherein the statute would be constitu-
tional.5 The Casey Court, without explicitly rejecting that standard,
applied a more liberal analysis.6 As articulated by Justice O'Connor,
a statute need not be unconstitutional in all circumstances to be ren-
dered facially invalid;7 it need only pose a substantial obstacle in a
large percentage of the cases in which it is relevant.' The plurality
applied this standard to strike down Pennsylvania's spousal notifica-
tion provision9 and relied on extensive factual findings to analyze the
impact on the identified group. Lower courts'°-indeed the Justices
3. See infra part II.
4. See infra part II.D.5.
5. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
6. See infra part I1.D.6.
7. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
8. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829-30.
9. Id.; see infra part H.E.3.
10. See infra part M.B.l.a, IIm.B.2.
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themselves"-have disputed the boundaries of Justice O'Connor's
opinion and have struggled with both the appropriate standard of re-
view in facial challenge cases and the relevance of factual findings.
Part III analyzes state and federal cases applying Casey's
precepts. When we began our research, we anticipated that post-
Casey case law would have fleshed out the contours of the admittedly
ambiguous undue burden test. We expected that courts considering
abortion regulations, even provisions similar to those at issue in
Casey, would have considered the factual findings before them to de-
termine if a particular statute actually imposed an undue burden.12
What the cases reveal, however, is not a focus on the undue bur-
den test. Rather, the courts have focused on the related facial chal-
lenge standard, a focus that has sometimes allowed them to avoid
applying the undue burden test at all.' 3 Even when a court attempted
to analyze a particular provision, it often resorted to reliance on the
fact that the provision at issue "looked and smelled" like the Penn-
sylvania regulations considered in Casey and concluded that Casey's
constitutional determinations controlled. Rarely did a court look to
the record before it or permit evidence to be introduced that might
distinguish the purpose or effect of the regulation at issue from the
regulations in Casey.14
Other trends are also notable. The undue burden test has been
applied outside the abortion context to statutes affecting other privacy
rights, most notably in the area of assisted suicide.' 5 State courts have
considered the effect of Casey on state constitutional analysis, some-
times considering themselves bound by the decision and sometimes
reaching the opposite conclusion.' 6 Occasionally, state courts have re-
lied on their state constitutions to afford greater freedom to the abor-
tion right than provided under the undue burden standard.17
Ultimately, because the Casey plurality opinion articulated both the
undue burden and facial challenge standards so ambiguously, lower
courts have largely either misapplied the analysis or simply ignored
the directive of the Supreme Court.
11. See infra parts II.D.6, III.B.1.b.
12. See infra part mI.B.2.
13. See infra part II.B.1.
14. See infra part II.B.3.
15. See infra part m.C.I.
16. See infra part I.D.
17. See infra part M.D.
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II. TIE CAsEY DECISION
In 1992 the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, six years after the first district court decision. 18
18. 112 S. Ct. 2791, cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 931 (1992). From its origin in 1988 to the
present, Casey has progressed through no fewer than 11 court opinions. In the initial case,
the district court granted an injunction barring enforcement of amendments to the Penn-
sylvania Abortion Act of 1982. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 686 F. Supp. 1089, 1092
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (citing Act of Mar. 25, 1988, Pub. L. 262, No. 31, § 4) [hereinafter Casey I].
Proceedings were stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Following the Court's decision in Webster, the
district court extended the injunction to encompass the 1989 amendments and permitted
the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 736 F. Supp.
633, 633 (E.D. Pa. 1990) [hereinafter Casey I].
In the trial on the merits, the district court made extensive factual findings relative to
the challenged provisions. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1373-74 (E.D.
Pa. 1990) [hereinafter Casey III], aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Applying what appears to be a strict scrutiny standard, see
id. at 1373-74, the court struck down the parental consent, spousal notification, waiting
period, and informed consent requirements, but upheld some reporting requirements. Id.
at 1396.
On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected the district court's application of a strict scrutiny
standard. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Casey
IV], aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). The court argued-
with prescience-that in light of the splintered perspectives on the bench, Justice
O'Connor's undue burden standard, the most narrow view capable of garnering a majority,
was the applicable standard of review. Id. at 696-97. The court applied the undue burden
standard, however, as articulated in O'Connor's previous opinions; thus, statutes that un-
duly burden the right to privacy were evaluated under strict scrutiny, while those that did
not were subject only to rational basis review. Id. at 689-91.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 931
(1992) [hereinafter Casey V].
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). A highly
splintered Court affirmed most of the Third Circuit's decision, but refined the undue bur-
den analysis. Id. at 2821-22; see infra part ll.D. In the process the Court also suggested it
was modifying the traditional facial challenge standard. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829; see infra
part II.D.6. The Court remanded to the district court "for proceedings consistent with this
opinion, including consideration of the question of severability." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2833.
On remand, the Third Circuit determined that the spousal notification provision and
the reporting requirement struck down by the Supreme Court were severable, and re-
manded to the district court for further proceedings. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 978
F.2d 74, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Casey VII].
On remand from the Third Circuit, the district court agreed to reopen the record to
receive evidence as to whether the provisions upheld by the Supreme Court were, in fact,
undue burdens on the abortion right under Justice O'Connor's fact-specific analysis.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 822 F. Supp. 227, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1993) [hereinafter Casey
VIII], rev'd by Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994), and stay denied by
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909, 909 (1994) (Souter, J., as Circuit Justice); see
infra part II.D.6.
This decision was appealed to the Third Circuit which held that the district court had
no authority to reopen the record; the only question before it was that of severability.
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Observers on both sides of the abortion issue anticipated that the
Court was poised to overturn the constitutional right to choose abor-
tion recognized in Roe v. Wade.19 The result was a highly fractured
opinion that reflected the Court's deep division on the abortion issue.
Surprisingly, however, Justice O'Connor garnered a majority to affirm
the "essential holding" of Roe:20 A woman's fundamental liberty in-
terests preclude a state from enacting a total ban on abortion.21
Roe's trimester framework did not, however, survive the opin-
ion.22 Instead, the Court redrew the constitutional line at viability,
Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Casey IX], stay
denied by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909, 909 (1994) (Souter, J., as Circuit
Justice). According to the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court in Casey had disposed of all
other issues, and the district court was not free to review the Supreme Court's conclusions.
Id at 857.
The plaintiffs appealed to Justice Souter as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit, re-
questing a stay of the Third Circuit's decision pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Planned Parenthhod v. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909, 909 (1994) (Souter, J., as Circuit Justice)
[hereinafter Casey X]. Justice Souter refused to issue the stay, seemingly with reluctance,
holding that it was unlikely the Court would grant certiorari or that the plaintiffs would
prevail on a facial challenge. Id at 911-12. Justice Souter suggested, however, that an "as
applied" challenge might enjoy greater success. Id. at 910 n.3.
Subsequently, the district court granted $221,971 in costs and attorneys' fees to plain-
tiffs as prevailing parties in Casey. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, No. 88-3228, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16675, at *27 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 1994) [hereinafter Casey X1]. The figure
represented a 60% reduction in the total costs because the plaintiffs had prevailed on only
some of the issues advanced. Id. at *21.
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Under Roe, most courts held that "any regulation touching
upon the abortion decision must survive strict scrutiny, to be sustained only if drawn in
narrow terms to further a compelling state interest." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817.
Justice Blackmun articulated the general expectation that the Court stood prepared to
eliminate reproductive freedom and expressed surprise that it did not.
[In 1989] four Members of this Court appeared poised to "cas[t] into darkness the
hopes and visions of every woman in this country" who had come to believe that
the Constitution guaranteed her the right of reproductive choice. All that re-
mained between the promise of Roe and the darkness of the plurality was a sin-
gle, flickering flame. Decisions since Webster gave little reason to hope that this
flame would cast much light. But now, just when so many expected the darkness
to fall, the flame has grown bright.
Id at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted)
(quoting Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 557 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
20. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
21. Id at 2820 (stating that statute with purpose of placing substantial obstacle in path
of woman seeking to abort nonviable fetus was invalid because means state chooses must
be calculated to inform free choice, not hinder it).
22. It at 2818 ("We reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be
part of the essential holding of Roe.").
Under Roe, the woman's liberty interests were so compelling during the first trimester
that the state could not interfere: "[T]he abortion decision and its effectuation must be left
to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician." Roe, 410 U.S. at
[Vol. 28:971
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holding that post-Roe decisions had undervalued the state's interests
in regulating abortion prior to viability.23 The change was significant:
As articulated and applied in Casey, the new undue burden test al-
lowed the Court to uphold state regulation to an extent that clearly
would have been prohibited under Roe.34
The Court also modified the traditional facial challenge test of
United States v. Salerno.35 Without expressly articulating an intent to
revise the standard, Justice O'Connor redefined the analysis, focusing
the inquiry on the group affected by the statute rather than asking
whether the statute could be constitutionally applied in other circum-
stances.26 The change effectively reduced the plaintiff's burden in
bringing a successful facial challenge.
A. The Court Reaffirmed the Essential Holding of Roe
Five members of the Court27 joined part I of the plurality opinion
which retained and reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe.28 In the
Court's view, this essential holding was comprised of three principles:
164. Only at the end of the first trimester did the "State's important and legitimate interest
in the health of the mother" become compelling since prior to that time mortality as a
result of abortion appeared to be less likely than mortality as a result of normal childbirth.
Id. at 163.
During and after the second trimester, state regulation of abortion was permitted "to
the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of ma-
ternal health." Id. The "State's important and legitimate interest in potential life [became
compelling] at viability... because the fetus then presumably ha[d] the capability of mean-
ingful life outside the mother's womb." Id Under the rubric of this purpose, a state "may
go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it [was] necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother." Id at 163-64.
23. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818.
24. "Measures aimed at ensuring that a woman's choice contemplates the conse-
quences for the fetus do not necessarily interfere with the right recognized in Roe,
although those measures have been found to be inconsistent with the rigid trimester frame-
work announced in that case." Id; see also id. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Application of the strict scrutiny standard [of Roe would result] in
the invalidation of all the challenged provisions."). For example, the Court overruled prior
cases which had struck down informed consent requirements on the basis of Roe and up-
held Pennsylvania informed consent requirements under the undue burden test. Id at
2823.
25. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Under Salerno, a party mounting a facial challenge to a stat-
ute must show that "no set of circumstances exists under which the [regulation] would be
valid." Id at 745 (emphasis added).
26. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829 ("The analysis does not end with the one percent of wo-
men upon whom the statute operates; it begins there.... The proper focus of constitutional
inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is
irrelevant."). See infra part II.D.6.
27. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
28. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
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(1) "the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before via-
bility and to obtain it without undue interference from the State";29
(2) "the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the
law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger a woman's
life or health";30 and (3) "the principle that the State has legitimate
interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of
the woman and the life of the fetus.'
B. The Court Concluded That the Right to Choose Abortion Is
Rooted in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment
The same five Justices who upheld the essential holding of Roe
also concluded that "[c]onstitutional protection of the woman's deci-
sion to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 32 The majority observed that mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rear-
ing "involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
[and] central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
'33
Justice O'Connor avoided explicitly classifying a woman's right to
choose abortion as "fundamental"34 but rejected Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's view that laws infringing that right deserve only rational basis
review. Justice O'Connor also rejected Justice Scalia's view that
"the power of a woman to abort her unborn child" does not even
29. Md
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2807.
34. In the usual case, laws that infringe upon a right deemed fundamental under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment invoke strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Casey
IV, 947 F.2d 682,688 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992). Perhaps because she rejected traditional strict scrutiny of abortion restrictions in
favor of the undue burden test, Justice O'Connor instead spoke of "[c]onstitutional protec-
tion," "substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," "realm[s] of per-
sonal liberty which the government may not enter," and "substantive spherefs] of liberty
which the Fourteenth Amendment protects" when discussing a woman's right to choose
abortion. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804-05. Even so, this is consistent with Justice O'Connor's
position in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,453,465
n.10 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), that the right to
abortion is a more "limited" fundamental right.
35. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("[I]n terming this right fundamental, the Court in Roe read the earlier
opinions upon which it based its decision much too broadly.").
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reach the level of a constitutionally protected liberty because it was
neither mentioned in the Constitution nor traditionally protected in
American society.36 In fact the plurality freely admitted that "adjudi-
cation of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in
interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by
tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its
boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule."'37
C. The Court Relied on Stare Decisis to Affirm the Essential
Holding of Roe
The Court relied upon stare decisis, at least in part, to justify its
affirmation of Roe's central holding,38 noting that none of the four
"prudential and pragmatic considerations" that guide the Court in re-
examining a prior decision supported overturning Roe.39 First, Roe
had not proved unworkable 40 since it set "a simple limitation beyond
which a state law [was] unenforceable," 4 ' and applying its rule was
well "within judicial competence."'4 Second, subsequent decisions
had been extensively relied upon: "[Flor two decades of economic
and social developments, people have organized intimate relation-
ships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event
that contraception should fail."'43 Third, subsequent constitutional de-
cisions had neither eroded Roe's doctrinal footings, nor left it "a
remnant of [an] abandoned doctrine."'45
36. IA at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Oddly enough, Justice Scalia joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion. The positions repre-
sented by the two opinions are facially inconsistent because Justice Rehnquist would find a
constitutionally protected, though not fundamental, liberty interest, while Justice Scalia
would deny any level of constitutional protection to a woman's privacy interest in the abor-
tion decision. Compare id. at 2858-60 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) with id. at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part). As a practical matter, however, rational basis review and no review achieve the
same result-no real protection of the woman's interest.
37. Id. at 2806. "Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substan-
tive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects." Id. at 2805.
38. Id. at 2808-16.
39. Id. at 2808.
40. Id. at 2809.
41. Id
42. Id
43. Id
44. Id at 2810.
45. Id. at 2808.
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Finally, although "time ha[d] overtaken some of Roe's factual as-
sumptions"-medical advances permitted safer abortions later into
the pregnancy and viability was possible at an earlier gestational
age-those assumptions had bearing only on the time scheme control-
ling the weight of the competing interests of the woman and the
state.46 They did not bear on the validity of Roe's central holding
"that viability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in
fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on
nontherapeutic abortions." 47 Only the Court's "doctrinal disposition
to come out differently" had changed; its understanding of the facts
had not.48
D. The Undue Burden Test for Impingement on the Right to
Choose Abortion and Justifications for Restrictions of
That Right
The Casey plurality opinion rejected Roe's strict scrutiny test,
contending that Roe undervalued the state's interest in the abortion
decision. 49 In its place, the Court erected an undue burden frame-
work, concluding that "the undue burden standard is the appropriate
means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitu-
tionally protected liberty."50 Justice O'Connor articulated the undue
burden test in a part of the opinion joined only by Justices Kennedy
and Souter.51
Simply stated, "[a]n undue burden exists, and therefore a provi-
sion of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus
attains viability.15 2 Unfortunately, however, the test is more easily ar-
ticulated than applied.
46. 1d at 2811. At viability the state's legitimate interesis become so compelling as to
permit direct restrictions on abortion. See infra part II.D.2.
47. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2811.
48. Id In contrast, the Supreme Court had overturned Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Mississippi, 342 U.S. 421 (1952),
and by Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled in field of public education by
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)-cases similar in importance to Roe. How-
ever, these actions were defensible "as applications of constitutional principle to facts as
they had not been seen by the Court before." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2813.
49. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
50. Id. at 2820.
51. Id. at 2816-21.
52. Id. at 2821.
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Justice O'Connor selected a term, undue burden,5 3 outside the
traditional rational basis-strict scrutiny framework.5 4 Because the lat-
ter terms have been defined and interpreted extensively in case law,
they are more easily applied. The Court has generally filled out the
contours of the analyses and predetermined the levels of justification
and impingement that render a law constitutional or unconstitutional.
In contrast, the Casey opinion remains ambiguous; the plurality did
not explicitly specify how the undue burden test weighs justification
and impingement in its constitutional balancing.55
1. Revaluing the legitimate interests of the state in the
abortion decision
Having recognized the "constitutional liberty of the woman to
have some freedom to terminate her pregnancy,"56 the plurality has-
tened to assert that the exercise of that right could still be limited by
justifiable state interests:
The woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from
the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of
the unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the
State's interest in life has sufficient force so that the right of
the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted. 7
53. Justice O'Connor used a different undue burden test in prior abortion cases. See
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 459 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment in part); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 530
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting), overruled by Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416,453 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992). In Akron, Justice O'Connor characterized her undue burden standard as a
threshold inquiry that simply determined the correct level of judicial review to apply, 462
U.S. at 463 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), in contrast to the complex impingement and justifi-
cation test in Casey, see infra part 11.D.5.
54. Strict scrutiny is the standard of review generally used in fundamental rights cases,
while the deferential rational basis test is generally used in reviewing social and economic
legislation. Casey IV, 947 F.2d 682, 688 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Because the Roe Court determined that the abortion deci-
sion was a fundamental right, regulations limiting that right had to be justified by a compel-
ling state interest and narrowly drawn to further that interest. Id at 689 (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)). In contrast, "[a] statute is struck down under rational
basis review only if it is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.., and state
legislation is rarely invalidated." Id.
55. We offer one possible interpretation below. See infra part lI.D.5.
56. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816; see supra part II.B-C.
57. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816.
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Roe also spoke of the State's important and legitimate interests, but
the plurality considered that part of the decision to have been given
"too little acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its
subsequent cases."58
In Casey the Court identified the primary legitimate state interest
as "concern for the life of the unborn."5 9 This interest figured repeat-
edly in the plurality's analysis. The Court referred to it as the state's
"'important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of
human life' ,;60 the state's "'important and legitimate interest in po-
tential life' ,,;61 the state's "interest in protecting the life of the un-
born"; 62 and the state's "substantial interest in potential life."'63 In
fact, interest in the "life of the fetus that may become a child" was
part of the essential holding of Roe that was reaffirmed by the plural-
ity.64 Therefore, persuasive measures that favor childbirth over abor-
tion can be permissible even if they do not further a health interest.
65
The Court also determined that the state has a justifiable interest
in ensuring that the abortion choice is "thoughtful and informed.
66
Thus, "[e]ven in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact
rules and regulations designed to encourage [the woman] to know that
there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be
brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term."'67
In fact, this interest flows from the state's interest in potential life:
"States are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable framework for a
woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting mean-
ing. This ... [is] the inevitable consequence of our holding that the
State has an interest in protecting the life of the unborn.
68
58. Id. at 2817.
59. Id. at 2816.
60. Id. at 2817 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 162).
61. Id. (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 163).
62. Id. at 2818.
63. Id. at 2820.
64. Id. at 2804. After viability " 'the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality
of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.'" IM at 2821 (emphasis added) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65).
65. Id. 112 S. Ct. at 2825. Contra Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (stating that after first trimester
state could only "regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to
maternal health").
66. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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Finally, the state has a legitimate interest in "'protecting the
health of the pregnant woman.' ",69 This too is a part of the reaffirmed
essential holding of Roe.70
2. The viability line
The Court made clear that the state's legitimate interests in regu-
lating abortion are present from the outset of the pregnancy.71 Later
in the pregnancy, however, "the State's interest in life has sufficient
force so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can
be restricted." 72 The plurality drew the constitutional line at viability.
Before viability the woman has a right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy.73 After viability abortion can be restricted or, presumably,
banned. 74 The undue burden test implicitly weighs the state's inter-
ests against the woman's right to choose abortion only before
viability.75
The plurality concluded that it must draw a clear line at viability
"to give some real substance to the woman's liberty to determine
whether to carry her pregnancy to full term. ' 76 Furthermore, the plu-
rality noted that stare decisis favored the viability line. "The woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central
69. Id at 2820 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 162); see also id at 2821 ("Regulations
designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not
constitute an undue burden.").
70. Id at 2804. The state's interest in "preserving and protecting the health of the
pregnant woman," Roe, 410 U.S. at 162, was one of only two recognized legitimate state
interests. The other was protecting the potentiality of human life. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2847
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. See, eg., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804 ("[T]he State has legitimate interests from the
outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that
may become a child."); id at 2816 ("The woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that
from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn ...
72. Id at 2816.
73. Id
74.
Before viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibi-
tion of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's effec-
tive right to elect the procedure. [But the plurality opinion] is a confirmation of
the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains ex-
ceptions for pregnancies which endanger a woman's life or health.
Iii at 2804.
75. Id at 2820 (stating that undue burdens have "purpose or effect of placing a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus").
76. Id at 2816.
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principle of Roe v. Wade,"'  and the Roe opinion was a statement
"twice reaffirmed in the face of great opposition. '78
In addition, viability "is the time at which there is a realistic possi-
bility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that
the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fair-
ness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of
the woman. ' 79 Finally, drawing the line at viability was "fair" in the
plurality's view because "[i]n some broad sense it might be said that a
woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State's
intervention on behalf of the developing child."80
3. Rejecting Roe's trimester framework
The plurality rejected Roe's trimester framework, replacing it
with a decisional framework based on viability.8' The undue burden
test constitutionally protects a woman's right to choose abortion
before viability.8 After viability, the state may more freely restrict
the right.83 To the contrary, under Roe,
almost no regulation at all [was] permitted during the first
trimester of pregnancy; regulations designed to protect the
woman's health, but not to further the State's interest in po-
tential life, [were] permitted during the second trimester; and
during the third trimester, when the fetus [was] viable,
prohibitions [were] permitted provided the life or health of
the mother [was] not at stake.84
According to Justice O'Connor, the trimester framework was flawed
because "in its formulation it misconceive[d] the nature of the preg-
nant woman's interest; and in practice it undervalue[d] the State's in-
terest in potential life."
'8 5
The trimester framework was unnecessary "to ensure that the wo-
man's right to choose not become so subordinate to the State's inter-
est in promoting fetal life that her choice exists in theory but not in
fact."'86 Furthermore, because the trimester framework incorrectly
77. Id. at 2817.
78. Id. at 2816 (citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759; Akron, 462 U.S. at 419-20).
79. Id. at 2817.
80. Id.
81. IM. at 2818.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2817-18.
85. IAL at 2818.
86. Id.
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weighed the woman's right relative to the state's interest, "[m]easures
aimed at ensuring that a woman's choice contemplates the conse-
quences for the fetus [did] not necessarily interfere with the right rec-
ognized in Roe."' In place of the trimester framework, the plurality
imposed a previability-postviability framework. 8 The Court did
not, however, attempt to identify a specific point during pregnancy at
which viability began.
4. Impingement: Not every law that makes the right more difficult
to exercise is an infringement of that right
The plurality objected to post-Roe cases that described the right
protected in Roe as "a right to decide whether to have an abortion
'without interference from the State' "89 because the cases overlooked
the issue of impingement. "[N]ot every law which makes a right more
difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right."90 The
plurality criticized the trimester framework as having
led to the striking down of some abortion regulations which
in no real sense deprived women of the ultimate decision.
Those decisions went too far because the right recognized by
Roe is a right "to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 91
The Court thus signaled that some interference would be permitted,
and relied on the undue burden test to evaluate when the abortion
right had merely been made more expensive or more difficult to ob-
tain and when it had been unconstitutionally infringed.92
5. Impingement and justification: The interplay in the undue
burden test
Judicial review of legislation affecting fundamental rights has
three components: identifying the right, considering the degree of in-
fringement of the right, and evaluating the state's justifications for its
87. Id
88. See id at 2804.
89. Id. at 2819 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61 (1976)).
90. I at 2818 (noting, for example, that "not every ballot access limitation amounts to
an infringement of the right to vote").
91. I& at 2819 (emphasis added) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972)).
92. IM. at 2825.
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regulation. 3 Although the plurality affirmed a woman's right to
choose abortion prior to viability,94 the plurality's analysis of when
that right has been infringed and when that infringement could be jus-
tified was not well defined.
The term "undue burden" sounds as if it measures only infringe-
ment.95 The state's justification for interference with the right plays a
role, however, in even the most straightforward statement of the un-
due burden standard: "A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand
for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abor-
tion of a nonviable fetus., 96 The plurality did not, however, simply
evaluate purpose and effect in isolation. In its review of the informed
consent provision, the plurality noted that the state has a legitimate
interest in ensuring a mature and informed abortion decision. The
Court determined that the state can achieve that goal even by means
which might persuade some women to forego abortion.97
Yet the plurality never explicitly articulated how purpose and ef-
fect are integrated. As Professor Brownstein notes, "we are left with
the unenviable task of determining the standard's content by studying
the way the joint opinion applies the test and inferring rules of deci-
sion from the plurality's reasoning and holdings." 98
The Casey plurality may have intended that purpose and effect
interplay in one of two ways. The state's purpose could be a mere
threshold consideration; once the purpose is identified as valid, the
court simply progresses to the effects of the statute. On the other
hand, the legitimacy of the state's purpose may be central in balancing
the statute's purpose against its effects.
Under the first approach, a court would look to purpose only to
confirm that the justification for the regulation was legitimate. If the
purpose was indeed legitimate, the court would move on to determine
if the actual effect of the law-as demonstrated by the factual record
before the court-was to impose a substantial obstacle on a significant
93. Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed" The Role of Undue Burden Analysis
in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HAsTrNGs L.J. 867, 867 (1994).
94. See supra part lI.D.2.
95. Brownstein, supra note 93, at 881 (noting that opinions of Justices Scalia and Rehn-
quist at times "seem to read the undue burden standard as nothing more than a simplistic
effects test").
96. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 2824.
98. Brownstein, supra note 93, at 883.
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percentage of women. Once the state's legitimate purpose was con-
firmed, purpose would play no further role in the analysis.
Although this theory is initially appealing, it fails to account for
variations in how the Casey plurality applied the undue burden test to
different provisions of the Pennsylvania law. Professor Brownstein
explains that the effect of the parental consent requirement is proba-
bly to create a greater obstacle to obtaining an abortion than the
spousal notice provision, yet the parental consent provision was up-
held as constitutional while the spousal notice provision was invali-
dated.99 "The implication of these contrasting evaluations is that the
purposes of the two laws are different and that this difference is what
accounts for the plurality's inapposite conclusions regarding these
regulations." 100
The Court's evaluation of the state's purpose apparently also af-
fects the degree of deference it will give to a trial court's findings of
fact. In Casey the district court made extensive factual findings as to
the burdensome effects of both the spousal notice1°0 and the waiting
period provisions.102 The plurality dismissed the district court's con-
clusion that the waiting period provision was particularly burdensome
for some women, even though it found the findings "troubling."'0 3 In
contrast, the plurality extensively quoted the district court's findings
on spousal abuse, cited to sources not relied on by the trial court, and
stated that the information supplemented common sense.'0 4 If the
Court, having ascertained that both provisions had legitimate pur-
poses, had next simply examined the provisions' effects in isolation,
the difference between the Court's treatment of the factual findings
for the waiting period and the factual findings for the spousal notice
provision would have no principled explanation.
Although the Court failed to provide an explicit rationale for its
behavior, the second approach-the one we believe is implicit in its
99. Id. at 887. Differences in the protections afforded the rights of children as com-
pared to adults does not account for he differential treatment of these provisions. See
Planned Parenthood v. Neely, 804 F. Supp. 1210,1212 (D. Ariz. 1992) ("The young woman
is not beyond the protection of the Constitution merely on account of her minority. Based
on this analysis, it follows that it is a Constitutional liberty of the minor woman to have
some freedom to terminate her pregnancy.").
100. Brownstein, supra note 93, at 888.
101. Casey 111, 744 F. Supp. 1323,1358-63 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
by Casey IV, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992); see infra part II.E.3.
102. Id at 1351-52; see infra part II.E.2.
103. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
104. Id. at 2828.
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decision-accounts for the Court's different application of the undue
burden test in these two instances.
Under this second approach a court must engage in a'more com-
plex balancing of purpose against effect. "The right recognized by
Roe is a right 'to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion.' "105 Therefore, the degree of impingement must be weighed
against the state's justification to determine whether a particular im-
pingement on the abortion right is too great in light of its specific justi-
fication. The degree of governmental intrusion permissible before the
abortion right is held to be unconstitutionally infringed necessarily
hinges upon whether that intrusion is warranted: in other words,
whether the state interest is legitimate or compelling enough to justify
the infringement.
The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in
potential life leads to the conclusion that not all regulations
must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens on the right
to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue.
In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate
means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's
constitutionally protected liberty.
10 6
Furthermore, because the state is permitted to justify significant bur-
dens on the abortion decision, so long as they do not amount to a
substantial obstacle, the undue burden test is not a traditional strict
scrutiny test either.'07
Nor is Casey's undue burden standard a mere threshold test to
determine the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny.'0 8 In City of Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,0 9 Justice O'Connor
used undue burden as a threshold test that initially considered how
severely the regulation affected the abortion right: "Laws that did not
impose undue burdens would receive minimum rationality review;
105. Id. at 2819 (emphasis added) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972)).
106. Id. at 2820.
107. Under strict scrutiny, the state must show both a compelling purpose and that the
statute is narrowly tailored-that is, the least burdensome alternative to achieve that end.
See Casey IV, 947 F2d at 689. Undue burden analysis, in contrast, does not require that
the statute impose the least burdensome mechanism for achieving the state's purpose.
Rather, undue burden requires only that the statute be less than a substantial obstacle.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821. It need not be the least burdensome alternative. See supra part
II.D.
108. Brownstein, supra note 93, at'878-79.
109. 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992).
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laws that did impose undue burdens would be evaluated under strict
scrutiny."110 In marked contrast the Casey plurality utilized the un-
due burden test itself as an independent standard of review,"' differ-
ent from both traditional strict scrutiny and rational basis review.
Thus, in conducting the undue burden analysis, the initial critical
step is classifying the state's purpose: The more legitimate the pur-
pose, the more burdensome the state regulation can be. Courts must
first determine whether the Supreme Court: (1) has specifically disap-
proved the state's purpose in enacting an abortion regulation; (2) has
specifically approved the state's purpose; or (3) has not specifically
passed on the state purpose or has determined that it is at least per-
missible. An illegitimate state purpose is as much a substantial obsta-
cle to the right to decide as an absolute ban on previability abortions,
and thus both will constitute an undue burden. Legitimate or permis-
sible purposes, on the other hand, require the reviewing court to take
the next step and balance that purpose against the severity of the law's
infringement.
a. illegitimate state purposes
State purposes that strike directly at the right to choose abortion
were identified by the Court as explicitly illegitimate:1
2
A statute with [the] purpose [of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus] is invalid because the means chosen by the State to
further the interest in potential life must be calculated to in-
form the woman's free choice, not hinder it." 3
110. Brownstein, supra note 93, at 879.
111. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820 ("[A]n undue burden is an unconstitutional burden.").
112. Id. at 2819.
113. Id. at 2820.
It is unclear whether Justice O'Connor would approve of an inquiry into legislative
history to determine if a given statute has an invalid purpose. In Casey, Justice O'Connor
did not explain the basis for her conclusions about the legislative purposes of the provi-
sions before the Court; it is conceivable that the Court inferred legislative intent from the
content of the Pennsylvania provisions.
Inquiring into a statute's legislative history might establish that a statute that seems to
have a legitimate purpose on its face was, in fact, enacted specifically to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. For example, the Casey plurality
recognized that a mandatory 24-hour waiting period has the legitimate purpose of "at-
tempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision." IM. at
2823. A state could enact a 24-hour waiting period, however, for the single, specific pur-
pose of restricting previability abortions, and not to ensure thoughtful, informed decisions.
If proven through the introduction of legislative history, the logic of the undue burden test
should render that state's 24-hour waiting period unconstitutional.
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The Court also specifically disapproved of at least one of the pur-
poses behind Pennsylvania's spousal notice provision because it was
based on an outdated view of a woman's role in the family as
subordinate to her husband." 4 Had this purpose been the only one
the Court recognized, the plurality would likely have found the
spousal notice provision to be unduly burdensome without further
analysis of the provision's effect on the woman's right. 15
b. approved state purposes
The Court also identified unquestionably legitimate purposes:
expressing concern for the life of the unborn; ensuring that the abor-
tion decision is thoughtful and informed; and protecting the health of
the pregnant woman." 6 When the plurality applied the undue burden
test to the Pennsylvania provisions, it held that those with presump-
tively valid purposes imposed an undue burden only if the actual effect
of the statute was to create a substantial obstacle to the woman seek-
ing an abortion.117 The twenty-four-hour waiting period, informed
consent, and parental consent provisions-all upheld as constitu-
tional-were based on the permissible purpose of ensuring an in-
formed, thoughtful decision."18
Thus, if an abortion regulation has a Court-approved purpose, its
effect on the right must be severe in order for it to constitute an undue
burden. This conclusion can be drawn from the Court's application of
the undue burden test to the twenty-four-hour waiting period require-
ment." 9 The district court made "troubling" findings of fact that the
provision would lead to significantly increased costs and delays, par-
ticularly for financially disadvantaged women.120 For some women,
these effects would presumably be sufficient to prevent effective ac-
cess to abortion, yet the Court found that the evidence did not demon-
strate effects severe enough to amount to an undue burden.' 2'
114. Id. at 2831 ("The husband's interest in the life of the child his wife is carrying does
not permit the State to empower him with this troubling degree of authority over his
wife.... A State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents
exercise over their children."). For further discussion of the Court's analysis of the spousal
notice provision, see infra part II.E.3.
115. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2831; see infra part II.D.5.c.
116. See supra part ll.D.1.
117. Brownstein, supra note 93, at 885.
118. Id. at 886.
119. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825-26; see infra part II.E.2.
120. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
121. Id at 2825; see infra part II.E.2.
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c. less legitimate and unclassified state purposes
The Court recognized that "a husband has a 'deep and proper
concern and interest... in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and
development of the fetus she is carrying,'" but this interest was not
among those the Court explicitly identified as legitimate. 122 Other
state purposes might also fall between the expressly illegitimate and
the expressly legitimate. As to these purposes,
the plurality will construe a less severe impact to be an un-
due burden if the purpose of the law creating that effect is of
marginal legitimacy and importance, while a burden of
greater magnitude will be held not to be undue if it is the
result of a law that serves a particularly valid or compelling
objective. 23
Thus, for merely acceptable purposes, a lower court is to engage in ad
hoc balancing of purpose and effect-the more valid the state's pur-
pose in the eyes of the Court, the more of an obstacle the statute must
create to be invalidated, and vice versa.
Although a court is to balance purpose and effect when the
state's purpose is either expressly legitimate or when it is merely ac-
ceptable, the effect of the statute is more determinative in the latter
situation because a lesser showing of impingement is required. The
factual record before the court becomes a mechanism for establishing
that effect.
In Casey, the Court looked to the factual record to determine the
severity of the effects caused by the spousal notice provision and con-
sidered evidence that some women would anticipate being battered if
forced to comply with the statute and the likelihood that they would
therefore forego abortion supported the conclusion that the provision
constituted an undue burden.124
122. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,61
(1976)); see also Brownstein, supra note 93, at 889 ("[T]he state's objective of protecting
the husband's 'concern and interest' in the fetus, while certainly not a presumptively valid
purpose, would at least seem to be a barely permissible one.").
123. Brownstein, supra note 93, at 891 (emphasis omitted). Professor Brownstein ob-
serves that such a test is both hard to apply and amorphous: "It requires a threshold in-
quiry as to both means and ends into the state's purpose in adopting a challenged law, and
then, depending on the nature of the state's purpose, an evaluation of the impact of the law
to see if it constitutes an 'undue burden.'" Id. at 892. Indeed the test's very malleability
may dismay lower courts seeking definitive guidance and certainty in this emotionally
charged area of the law.
124. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
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The analysis, however, must be taken a step further. Because the
degree of impingement on a right becomes pivotal to the constitution-
ality of the statute, demarcation of the sample against which this mea-
surement is to be taken becomes crucial if the law is facially
challenged. In fact, the facial challenge standard may effectively con-
trol the statute's constitutionality. If the effect is to be measured by its
impact on all women-in all the potential applications of the stat-
ute'15-the effect will necessarily be less severe for some women, and
the statute will likely survive a facial challenge. If, however, the effect
is to be measured based only upon its impact on the group "upon
whom the statute operates,' 26 the effect will likely be far more sub-
stantial, and the statute is less likely to be upheld.
6. Facial challenge analysis
a. the Salerno standard for facial challenges
A statute may be held unconstitutional either on its face or as
applied. 27 The distinction is significant both in terms of the showing
that is required by the party bringing the action and the effect of a
successful challenge. 2s The practical effect of holding a statute un-
constitutional "on its face" is to render it completely inoperative.129
In contrast, a successful "as applied" challenge prohibits the statute
from being enforced in the particular situation; it may continue to be
applied in other circumstances.
30
The Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno'31 articulated the
traditional facial challenge standard: "[T]he challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.' 32 Because the challenger must demonstrate that a statute is
unconstitutional in all its applications, a facial challenge is the most
125. This, essentially, is the "no set of circumstances" standard for facial challenges set
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,745 (1987). See infra part
ll.D.6.a.
126. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829 ("The analysis does not end with the one percent of wo-
men upon whom the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is measured for consis-
tency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects."); see infra part
II.D.6.b.
127. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. Rnv.
235, 236 (1994).
128. Id.
129. Id.; see Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 113 S. Ct. 633, 633
(1992) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
130. Doff, supra note 127, at 236.
131. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
132. Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
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difficult challenge to mount successfully. Establishing that a statute
"might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of cir-
cumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid. '133
An exception has been carved out in the First Amendment area,
based on concerns that the Salerno standard would have the effect of
chilling speech. 134 Under the First Amendment substantial over-
breadth doctrine, a litigant may argue that a statute should be invali-
dated not because it is unconstitutional as to that litigant, but because
it would be unconstitutional to apply it to a third party not before the
court.
135
Professor Doff argues, however, that the overbreadth doctrine
has been applied in contexts other than the First Amendment. 36
"[A]n examination of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine reveals
that its special standing component and concerns about the 'chilling'
effects of overbroad laws have properly been applied in other funda-
mental rights cases."'137
b. the facial challenge standard under Casey
In Casey, Justice O'Connor did not apply Salerno's no set of cir-
cumstances standard, but neither did she expressly reject it. In strik-
ing down the spousal notification requirement of the Pennsylvania
statute, Justice O'Connor rejected respondents' argument that, be-
cause some women would be able to notify their husbands without
adverse consequences, the statute could not be invalid on its face. 38
We disagree with respondents' basic method of analysis.
The analysis does not end with the one percent of wo-
men upon whom the statute operates; it begins there. Legis-
lation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by
its impact on those whose conduct it affects.... The proper
focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law
is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is
irrelevant.
39
133. Id.
134. Doff, supra note 127, at 261.
135. Id.
136. See id. for a comprehensive review of the facial challenge standard and argument
that overbreadth analysis is the appropriate standard for fundamental rights cases.
137. Id. at 261.
138. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
139. I.
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Justice O'Connor seemed to be suggesting that an overbreadth-
type analysis was appropriate in the abortion context, but her opinion
failed to explicitly articulate her reasoning and intention in relation to
Salerno. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
White, later disputed this suggestion in a dissent to a denial of certio-
rari in another case. 4 ° Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Court's
opinion in Roe had seemingly employed an overbreadth approach.141
However, he argued that that view had been rejected-by Justice
O'Connor herself-in subsequent abortion cases and asserted that the
Court had not purported to change the Salerno test in Casey. 42 Fur-
thermore, in his view such an approach was inappropriate in the abor-
tion context because it interfered with the state's ability to limit and
refine its statutes.' 43
The Court's next pronouncement on the facial challenge issue
came in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Fargo Women's Health Or-
ganization v. Schafer. 44 Joined by Justice Souter, Justice O'Connor
refuted the contention that a statute must be unconstitutional in all
circumstances in order to be struck down on a facial challenge.145
Moreover, she reiterated the Court's reliance on the factual record in
determining whether a regulation created an undue burden for a sig-
nificant number of women,' 46 and indicated that the lower court
"should have undertaken the same analysis."' 47
Two conclusions can thus be drawn from this decision. First,
Casey intended that a statute need not be unconstitutional in all cir-
cumstances, but in only a "'large fraction of the cases in which [it
would] operate as a substantial obstacle.' 148 Secondly, the court
must review the record developed in the case in order to determine
whether the statute constitutes an undue burden.1
49
140. Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 113 S. Ct. 633, 633 (1992)
(mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
141. ld. at 634.
142. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see infra part III.B.1.b.
143. Ada, 113 S. Ct. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
144. 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1668 (1993) (mem.) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certio-
rari) [hereinafter Fargo II]. Fargo I originally was heard as Fargo Women's Health Or-
ganization v. Sinner, 819 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.D. 1993) [hereinafter Fargo 1], in the district
court. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Fargo I in Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Scha-
fer, 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Fargo III].
145. See Fargo 11, 113 S. Ct. at 1669 (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
146. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
147. Id. (O'Connor, I., concurring in denial of certiorari).
148. I1& (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2830).
149. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
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The modified facial challenge standard thus represents the view
of an uncertain complement of the court. Five Justices joined part
V.C. of the plurality opinion in Casey in which the facial challenge
standard was modified.' Justice O'Connor, the author of the plural-
ity opinion in Casey, and Justice Souter clearly support the change. 5 1
Given the lack of support by other members of the Court, however, it
appears that the facial challenge standard may have been modified in
theory, but perhaps not in fact-at least not in application.
E. Applications of the Undue Burden Test to Pennsylvania's
Abortion Statute in Casey
As amended in 1988 and 1989, Pennsylvania's Abortion Control
Act of 1982152 contained five contested provisions. The first defined
the "medical emergency" exception, which permitted immediate abor-
tions without compliance with the remainder of the statute. 53 Sec-
ond, the statute required that, except in medical emergencies as
defined, a doctor provide specified information to a woman seeking
an abortion twenty-four hours before the procedure.'54 Third, the
statute required that, except in medical emergencies or specified situa-
tions, a married woman provide a signed statement attesting to the
fact that she had notified her husband of her intent to obtain an abor-
tion. 55 Fourth, except in medical emergencies, a minor seeking an
abortion was required to obtain either the consent of one parent or
court authorization for the procedure. 56 Fifth, the statute required
specified record keeping and reporting by every abortion facility. 57
Unfortunately, the Court's sometimes ambiguous or incomplete appli-
cation of the undue burden test to these provisions compounded the
problem of an ambiguously defined test.
1. The Court held the definition of a medical emergency to
be constitutional
The medical emergency provision permitted immediate abortions
without compliance with other provisions of the statute when, in the
150. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
151. Fargo 11, 113 S. Ct. at 1668 (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari, Souter
J., joining).
152. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3203-3220 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
153. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (1983).
154. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. Am. § 3205 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
155. 18 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (Supp. 1994); see infra part II.E.3.
156. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
157. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3207(b), 3214(a), (f).
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doctor's good-faith judgment, an abortion was necessary to avert
death or when delay would create a serious risk of "substantial and
irreversible impairment of [a] major bodily function."' 58 The court of
appeals construed the statute so as to "'not in any way pose a signifi-
cant threat to the life or health of a woman.' "159
In a very brief discussion of this provision, a majority of the Court
simply proclaimed that they normally defer to a lower court's inter-
pretation of state law, and concluded that, "as construed by the Court
of Appeals, the medical emergency definition impose[d] no undue
burden on a woman's abortion right.' 160 Elsewhere in the opinion,
the Court had recognized the state's legitimate interest in "'protect-
ing the health of the pregnant woman.' ,161
Furthermore, the Court did not analyze the effect of the provi-
sion on the exercise of the abortion right. Presumably the broadening
construction of the medical emergency exception either: (1) pre-
vented the statute from placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking the abortion of a nonviable fetus given the state's le-
gitimate interest;162 or (2) simply confirmed the holding of Roe-reaf-
firmed by Casey-that the state could not regulate or proscribe
abortion so as to jeopardize the mother's life or health. 63 In any
event the constitutionality of the medical emergency definition so con-
strued was "central to the operation"-and presumably the constitu-
tionality-of the other requirements. 64
2. The Court held the informed consent and mandatory waiting
period provisions constitutional
The informed consent provisions required, except in medical
emergencies or when the information would have a serious effect on
the woman's physical or mental health, that a woman seeking an abor-
tion be provided: (1) information about the procedure, health risks,
and the fetus' probable gestational age by a doctor; and (2) state
materials describing the fetus and information on assistance and social
services by a doctor or other qualified person. 65 Once the informa-
158. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (1983).
159. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822 (quoting Casey IV, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part by Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2820 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
162. See supra part ll.D.5.
163. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
164. Id. at 2822.
165. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
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tion was provided, the statute imposed a mandatory twenty-four-hour
waiting period before the procedure could be performed.
66
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter found that "the giving
of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the proce-
dure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the 'prob-
able gestational age'" served the state's legitimate interest in
potential life.1 67 In addition, the Court held that information about
the impact of abortion on the fetus-even when those consequences
were unrelated to the woman's health-served the legitimate purpose
of ensuring thoughtful, informed decisions.168 The Court's evaluation
of the effect of this provision was limited, however, to merely noting
that although it "might cause the woman to choose childbirth over
abortion [it] cannot be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining
an abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden."'169 As to the
twenty-four-hour waiting period, the Court decided that such a mea-
sure could serve the state's legitimate interest in ensuring an informed
choiceY.7 0
The plurality, after classifying the purpose as legitimate, then
asked "[w]hether the mandatory 24-hour waiting period is nonethe-
less invalid because in practice it is a substantial obstacle to a woman's
choice to terminate her pregnancy.' 7' The Court at this point rede-
fined the facial challenge analysis. Instead of requiring the plaintiffs
to establish that no circumstance existed in which the statute might be
constitutional before rendering it facially invalid, the Court looked to
166. Id.
167. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823.
168. Id. The plurality stated that, likewise, they "would think it constitutional for the
State to -require that in order for there to be informed consent to a kidney transplant
operation the recipient must be supplied With information about risks to the donor as well
as risks to himself or herself." Id.
169. Id. at 2824. The plurality also asked whether requiring that a physician provide
some of the information, as opposed to a qualified assistant, "would amount in practical
terms to a substantial obstacle." Id. Although City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), invalidated
a similar provision, because the record contained no evidence as to whether this provision
effectively erected a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion, the Court con-
cluded that this part of the provision was not an undue burden. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824.
The plurality continued, observing that the states are given broad latitude to require that
licensed professionals perform certain tasks, and thus upheld "the provision as a reason-
able means to insure that the woman's consent is informed." Id at 2824-25.
170. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
171. Id.
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specific findings of fact and, in evaluating the statute's effects, re-
stricted its analysis to the group on whom the statute operated.172
The district court had made factual findings that the waiting pe-
riod would have the practical effect of requiring two trips to the doc-
tor and many Pennsylvania women would be required to travel great
distances to reach an abortion provider.173 Abortions would often be
delayed for more than a day, and repeat trips would increase the wo-
man's exposure to harassment and the hostility of anti-abortion dem-
onstrators. 74 Finally, the burden of the waiting period would fall
heaviest on poor women, women who must travel great distances, and
women who would be unable to explain their absences to their hus-
bands or employers. 75
Even under a more lenient facial challenge standard, the Court
held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the effects resulted
in an undue burden. Although "[t]hese findings [were] troubling in
some respects,.., they [did] not demonstrate that the waiting period
constitute[d] an undue burden. 1 76 The plurality did not doubt that
"the waiting period ha[d] the effect of 'increasing the cost and risk of
delay of abortions.' ,,177 Even the "particularly burdensome" effects
of the waiting period on some women did not, however, require its
invalidation; the Court held that a "particular burden is not of neces-
sity a substantial obstacle," despite the district court's conclusion
about increased costs and possible delays. 78 The district court had
not declared that the "waiting period [was] such an obstacle even for
the women who are most burdened by it."'1 7 9 Perhaps disingenuously,
the Court determined that, "on the record before us, and in the con-
text of this facial challenge," the provision did not create an undue
burden. 1
80
172. See supra part ll.D.6.b.
173. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (quoting Casey Ii, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part by Casey IV, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by
Casey V, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)). The plurality concluded that the waiting period did not
constitute a health risk because of the lower court's construction of the medical emergency
exception. Id.
178. Id. at 2825-26.
179. Id In contrast to the waiting period provision, the spousal notice provision did not
have an expressly legitimate purpose. There, the Court did not rely on trial court conclu-
sions but instead reviewed the specific findings and additional studies and drew its own
conclusions. See id. at 2826-29.
180. Id. at 2826.
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The Court recognized the legitimacy of the state purpose-in-
formed, thoughtful decision making-and determined that the impact
of the regulation on the women who would be most affected by it did
not outweigh its purpose. Therefore, the informed consent provision
did not constitute an undue burden.
3. The Court held the spousal notification provision
unconstitutional
The spousal notification provision required that, except in medi-
cal emergencies, a married woman provide a signed statement that (1)
she had notified her husband of her intent to obtain an abortion; (2)
she was impregnated by another man; (3) her husband could not be
found; (4) the pregnancy was the result of a reported spousal sexual
assault; or (5) the woman would be injured by her husband if she in-
formed him.18' A doctor performing an abortion without the wo-
man's signed statement was subject to license revocation and liability
to the husband for damages.'1
The plurality identified two state purposes behind the spousal no-
tice statute. First, although "a husband has a 'deep and proper con-
cern and interest.., in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and
development of the fetus she is carrying,' ",83 before birth "[it is an
inescapable biological fact that state regulation with respect to the
child a woman is carrying will have a far greater impact on the
mother's liberty than on the father's."' 84 And "'[i]f the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child., " ' Therefore, the Constitution protects people from
"unjustified state interference, even when that interference is enacted
into law for the benefit of their spouses. "186
Second, the state could not promote the common-law view of the
woman's role in the family because the idea that a woman has no legal
existence apart from her husband no longer comports with "our un-
derstanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution." 187 The
Court found this purpose to be expressly illegitimate and forbade "the
181. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (Supp. 1994).
182. Id.
183. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830.
184. Id.
185. Id. (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original)).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2831.
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State to empower [a husband] with this troubling degree of authority
over his wife."'
1 88
In a part of the opinion that commanded a majority of the
Court,189 the Court-as it had when considering the informed consent
provisions-reviewed the district court's findings. This time, however,
the Court drew its own conclusions about the district court's findings
of fact, going so far as to use common sense and additional studies not
apparently relied upon by the lower court.190 This extended review
was in marked contrast to the analysis afforded the informed consent
and waiting period provisions.' 9'
Among the findings relied upon by the Court to strike down the
spousal notification requirement were conclusions that "the vast ma-
jority" of married women already consult their husbands before
choosing abortion;"9 that the "bodily injury" exception was not avail-
able to a woman who had a reasonable belief that her husband would
otherwise abuse or manipulate her; 93 that domestic violence touches
the lives of millions of women; 94 that "'[m]ere notification of preg-
nancy is frequently a flashpoint for battering' ,,;195 that the marital
rape exception was unusable because it is rarely reported; 9 6 and that
ultimately, the nature of battering relationships makes it unlikely that
the women to whom the exceptions apply would ever use it.'
97
The Court supported the district court's findings with additional
studies of domestic violence 98 and concluded that together they "re-
inforce what common sense would suggest":199
The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent
a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion.
It does not merely make abortions a little more difficult or
expensive to obtain; for many women, it will impose a sub-
188. Id.
189. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
190. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2828.
191. See supra part II.E.2.
192. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2826.
193. Id. For example, an abusive husband could retaliate against his wife by publicizing
her intent to have an abortion, by retaliating against her in future custody or divorce pro-
ceedings, or by using control over finances to deprive her of necessary monetary support
for her or her children. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2827 (quoting Casey 111, 744 F. Supp. at 1362).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2827-28.
199. Id. at 2828.
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stantial obstacle.., as surely as if the Commonwealth had
outlawed abortion in all cases.3°°
This was the majority's conclusion, even though they conceded that
this provision would affect only about one percent of the women who
obtain abortions,20 1 that is, "married women seeking abortions who
do not wish to notify their husbands of their intentions and who do
not qualify for one of the statutory exceptions to the notice
requirement.
'202
Indeed, the majority's facial challenge analysis insists that "[t]he
proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is
a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant. '20 3 Be-
cause the majority concluded-on its own analysis of the factual rec-
ord and in light of the statute's purposes-that "in a large fraction of
the cases" in which the provision is' relevant "it will operate as a sub-
stantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion," the
Court held the spousal notification provision invalid as an undue
burden.20
4. The Court held the parental consent provision constitutional
The parental consent provision required that, except in medical
emergencies, unemancipated women under the age of eighteen had to
obtain one parent's informed consent, subject to a judicial-bypass
mechanism. 0 5 The plurality condoned, in passing, the state's prof-
fered justification for the regulation-thoughtful, informed deci-
sions-because "the provisions regarding informed consent have
particular force with respect to minors. 20 6 The Court did not, how-
ever, specifically analyze how burdensome the effects of the provision
might be although they referenced the "arguments" made in opposi-
tion to the provision. 20 7
200. Id. at 2829.
201. Id.
202. 1d at 2829-30.
203. Id. at 2829 (analogizing to First Amendment overbreadth analysis and citing Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).
204. Id. at 2830.
205. Id at 2832.
206. Id.
207. Id.; see supra part I.E.2. Professor Brownstein notes that, compared to the
spousal notification provision, the parental consent provision "probably creates a more
substantial obstacle to the exercise of abortion rights." Brownstein, supra note 93, at 887.
The difference in constitutionality between the provisions can be attributed to the higher
degree of legitimacy the Court assigned to the purpose of the parental consent provision:
promoting informed consent. Id. at 891-92.
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5. The Court held the record keeping and reporting
provisions constitutional
The Pennsylvania statute also required that every abortion facil-
ity file a variety of reports. °s The Court upheld all of the record
keeping and reporting requirements except those related to spousal
notification. These were excepted because they "place[ ]. an undue
burden on a woman's choice" for the same reasons as the notification
provision itself.
209
The plurality concluded that the remaining record keeping and
reporting requirements related to the state's interest in the preserva-
tion of maternal health,210 a justification the Court specifically legiti-
mized.211 Because such medical information assists in research, the
Court concluded that "it cannot be said that the requirements serve
no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult. '2 1 2 Having
acknowledged a legitimate and approved purpose, the likelihood that
the requirements might "increase the cost of some abortions by a
slight amount" did not, on the record before the Court, render the
effect of the requirements so burdensome as to create a substantial
obstacle to a woman's choice.21 3
Ill. IN THE AFTERMATH OF CASEy. JUDICIAL RESPONSES
A. Introduction
In the two-and-a-half years since the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Casey, state and federal courts have rendered
some twenty-four opinions attempting to apply its precepts. Casey's
undue burden and facial challenge standards have arisen in cases in-
volving everything from state abortion regulations to state initiatives
to other privacy interests.21 4
208. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832. Clinics had to file reports regarding: the clinic's name
and address and those of related entities; quarterly reports indicating the number of abor-
tions performed by trimester; and specific information about each abortion performed, the
doctor performing the procedure, and the patient's medical history. Id. The woman's
identity was not to be revealed. Id.
209. Id at 2832-33.
210. Id. at 2832.
211. See supra part Il.D.1.
212. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2833.
213. Id
214. See infra part I.B-C.
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Furthermore, as of May 1994, the Supreme Court had declined to
review fourteen different abortion cases.215 State restrictions on abor-
tion have exploded.216 The undue burden analysis has been extended
to other privacy arenas: Courts have applied the undue burden analy-
sis to right to assisted suicide, grandparent fights, and drug testing
cases.
21 7
The courts, however, have been far from consistent in applying
the holdings of Casey. Some courts seem to obfuscate the undue bur-
den analysis by mixing the language of rational basis and strict scru-
tiny with that of undue burden. Others frankly admit they are
uncertain how to conduct the analysis and thus consider the chal-
lenged regulations under a variety of standards.21 8 Some simply
escape to their state constitutions to conduct a less ambiguous
analysis .2
19
If any generalization can be made about the cases that purport to
apply Casey's undue burden standard to abortion regulations, it is
this: They don't. When faced with an abortion regulation substan-
tially similar to those at issue in Casey, most courts simply rely on the
fact that since the Supreme Court upheld a similar provision in Casey,
the one at issue must likewise be constitutional; what we term the
"looks like Casey, smells like Casey, must be constitutional" approach.
With only rare exceptions, the lower courts have failed to review
either: (1) the specific purpose of the legislation as enacted by that
state; or (2) the effect of the law as evidenced by factual findings docu-
menting the degree of burden imposed. In fact, the only court to en-
gage in a full Casey undue burden analysis did so in the context of an
assisted suicide banll
Some courts have followed Casey so far as necessary to conclude
that outright previability abortion bans are unconstitutional undue
burdens because Casey deemed statutes with such an effect to be pre-
sumptively invalid." 1 Other courts have made clear that they are
uncertain how the undue burden analysis harmonizes with the facial
215. Nancy E. Roman, Breyer's Record Mixed on Abortion-Rights Issue, WASH. TIMES,
May 23, 1994, at Al.
216. For a comprehensive review of state abortion regulations, see THE NARAL FouN-
DATION, WHO DECIDES? A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW OF ABORTION RIGHTS (4th ed.
1993).
217. See infra part flI.C.
218. See infra part IIl.B.
219. See infra part III.D.
220. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
221. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
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challenge standard. Still others have ignored Justice O'Connor's
clear-and reiterated22z-entreaty to consider the factual context of
the regulation to determine whether it constitutes an undue burden.
In spite of the simplicity of the aphorism, it is true that "Mississippi
[or North Dakota or Utah] ain't Pennsylvania,"'' 3 and the impact of a
restriction on the abortion right may be significantly different in each
state.
In this section, we review how the lower courts have interpreted
and applied Casey in the abortion context, how Casey relates to other
privacy rights, and how the decision affects state constitutional
analysis.
B. The Abortion Cases
Predictably, state abortion regulations have generated most of
the post-Casey decisions interpreting and applying the undue burden
and facial challenge standards. Three recurring themes have emerged:
(1) controversy as to the applicable facial challenge standard; (2) the
appropriate balancing of purpose and effect in undue burden analysis;
and (3) the role of factual evidence. Most courts have resolved facial
challenges to these regulations by applying the Salerno no set of cir-
cumstances standard and determining that possible constitutional ap-
plications of the law defeated the challenge.' 4 Similarly, the courts
have disputed how, and to what extent, factual evidence is relevant. 25
Few courts have engaged in the balancing of purpose and effect im-
plicit in Casey.226
1. The facial challenge standard
a. confusion in the lower courts
Most post-Casey cases have been brought as facial challenges to
state statutes. Traditionally, a successful facial challenge must demon-
strate that a statute is unconstitutional in all its applications-no set of
circumstances exists wherein the statute may be constitutionally ap-
222. See Fargo H1, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669 (1993) (mem.) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari).
223. Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 15 n.5 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (paraphrasing plain-
tiff's argument that conditions in one state may be sufficiently different from conditions in
another to warrant different result), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
224. See infra part III.B.1.a.i.
225. See infra part m.B.2.
226. See infra part M.B.3.
[Vol. 28:971
CON LAW IS AS CON LAW DOES
plied.227 Casey applied a very different standard: If the regulation
operated to impose a substantial obstacle on the right to abortion in a
large fraction of the cases in which the statute was relevant, the statute
could not survive a facial challenge.'
The real question in the facial challenge debate is how the group
upon whom the statute operates is defined. Salerno defines the group
broadly: If a statute can be constitutionally applied-to anyone-
then it is not vulnerable to facial challenge.229 If the group is narrowly
defined-as the group upon whom the statute operates-the statute is
more likely to be successfully challenged. Furthermore, if the thresh-
old is set at "significant percentage" as opposed to "any application,"
the standard becomes even more relaxed.-30
The lower courts have been reluctant, even unwilling, to accept
Justice O'Connor's apparent modification of the facial challenge stan-
dard in Casey. 31 Salerno's no set of circumstances standard for facial
challenges 2 is a longstanding one, 3 and the courts' reluctance may
be, at least in part, a reaction to Justice O'Connor's failure to explic-
itly reject Salerno in the Casey opinion.
In concurring to a denial of certiorari in Fargo I,'- 4 Justice
O'Connor made clear that she had, in fact, intended to modify the
standard, but her concurrence was joined only by Justice Souter.235
Because Justice O'Connor was unable to muster even members of the
Casey plurality to support an explicit statement of the facial challenge
standard used in Casey, the prevailing standard remains uncertain.
Thus, the lower courts have been free to pursue either the Salerno
standard or the modified standard set forth by Justice O'Connor.
Some lower courts have ignored the controversy; some have com-
mented on the ambiguity of the applicable standard after Casey and
opted to apply one standard or the other.236 One court made an effort
227. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); see supra part II.D.6.a.
228. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829; see supra part II.D.6.b.
229. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
230. See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
231. See supra part lI.D.6.b.
232. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
233. Although Salerno is generally cited as authority for the no set of circumstances
standard for facial challenges, the Court articulated the standard in other cases. See Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991); Chicago & Northwest Ry. v. United Transp. Union,
402 U.S. 570, 582 (1971).
234. Fargo II, 113 S. Ct. 1668 (1993) (mem.) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
235. Id. at 1669.
236. See infra part Il.B.L.a.i-ii.
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to justify its opinion under both standards.237 Another seemed to
meld the purpose prong of undue burden analysis into the selection of
a standard; a more compelling state interest justified application of the
Salerno standard, while less compelling purposes were analyzed under
Justice O'Connor's more liberal analysis.238 Most courts, however, in
the absence of a clear directive from the Supreme Court have re-
treated to the familiar safety of Salerno?39
i. courts adhering to the Salerno line of cases
The Fifth Circuit in Barnes v. Moore240 was the first to squarely
address whether Casey modified the Salerno standard for facial chal-
lenges. The court acknowledged that Justice O'Connor seemed to
have applied a somewhat different facial challenge standard when the
Court struck down the spousal notification provision of the Penn-
sylvania statute, but concluded that Casey had not, in fact, abandoned
Salerno.24 "[W]e do not interpret Casey as having overruled, sub
silentio, longstanding Supreme Court precedent governing challenges
to the facial constitutionality of statutes.' ' 242 Having acknowledged
that Casey applied a different test than Salerno, the Fifth Circuit
nonetheless insisted that the plaintiffs "must 'establish that no set of
circumstances exist[ed] under which the Act would be valid.' "243 Be-
cause the Mississippi provisions at issue were substantially similar to
the Pennsylvania act upheld in Casey,244 the court concluded that the
plaintiffs could not satisfy the "heavy burden" of Salerno and upheld
the provisions.' 5
237. See, e.g., Utah Women's Clinic v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994).
238. See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992).
239. See infra part II.B.1.a.i.
240. 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992). At issue was
a facial challenge to a 1991 Mississippi law that mandated that doctors or their agents
provide specified information to women seeking abortions and imposed a 24-hour waiting
period after receipt of that information. 1d. at 13. The district court had granted a prelimi-
nary injunction enjoining enforcement of the provisions; this order was on appeal to the
Fifth Circuit when Casey was decided. Id,
241. Id. at 14 n.2.
242. Id. (citations omitted).
243. Id. at 14 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745).
244. Id.
245. Id.
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A month later a different panel of the Fifth Circuit 6 struck
down a Louisiana statute 7 that banned abortions except in very lim-
ited circumstances.4 8 This panel did not comment on the uncertainty
of the facial challenge standard. Salerno clearly would not have justi-
fied striking down the statute because some circumstances existed in
which the statute could be constitutionally applied-to ban
postviability abortions for example.249 But the nature of the provi-
sions-in that they amounted to a near-ban on nontherapeutic
previability abortions-was clearly contrary to the essential holding of
both Roe and Casey. 0 Thus, the court may have found it unneces-
sary to reach the facial challenge question.
The Fifth Circuit revisited the facial challenge controversy for the
third time in Barnes v. Mississippi-5' At issue was a statute requiring
that minors, subject to a judicial-bypass mechanism, obtain the con-
sent of both parents before having an abortion.5" The court reiter-
ated its conviction that plaintiffs must show there was no set of
circumstances under which the statute was constitutional.-53 The ma-
jority concluded that "the law [was] constitutional as to all minors in
246. Sojourner T v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992) (striking down Louisiana stat-
ute banning abortions except in very limited circumstances), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1414
(1993). Circuit Judges Reynaldo G. Garza, Davis, and Barksdale comprised the Sojourner
T panel. Id. at 28. Circuit Judges Emilio M. Garza and Jolly, and District Judge Shaw
comprised the Barnes v. Moore panel. Barnes v. Moore, 970 F2d at 13.
247. 1991 LA. Acrs No. 26, § 87 (doctor who administered drugs or performed proce-
dure with specific intent to perform abortion charged with criminal conduct). Id.
§ 87E.(1). The statute allowed for exceptions when: (1) the pregnancy was terminated to
preserve the life or health of an unborn child, or to remove a dead unborn child; (2) the
pregnancy was terminated to preserve the life of the mother, or (3) the pregnancy was the
result of rape or incest, was reported to law enforcement, and provided the abortion was
performed within the first 13 weeks of pregnancy. Id. § 87B.(3).
248. Sojourner T, 974 F.2d at 28. The distinction between the court's treatment of the
statutes struck down in this case and those upheld in Barnes v. Moore may rest in the
nature of the provisions-a relative ban as opposed to informed consent and waiting pe-
riod requirements. Both decisions were consistent with the Casey decision, and in fact
both Fifth Circuit panels relied on similarities between the statutes before them and those
at issue in Casey. See Sojourner T, 974 F.2d at 31; Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d at 13.
249. See, e.g., Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 113 S. Ct. 633, 634
(1992) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (dissenting because chal-
lenged Guam statute banning abortions except in medical emergency "would... be consti-
tutional at least in its application to abortions conducted after the point at which the child
may live outside the womb").
250. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804 ("Before viability, the State's interests are not strong
enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to
the woman's effective right to elect the procedure.").
251. 992 F2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993).
252. Id, at 1337.
253. Id. at 1342.
April 1995] 1007
1008 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Mississippi. There [would] be no 'unconstitutional impact upon a
small percentage of the minors seeking to obtain judicial consent for
an abortion.' "254
The dissent did not dispute the majority's invocation of the no set
of circumstances standard, but disagreed with how the majority de-
fined the group upon whom the statute operated.255 The Casey court
looked to the burden imposed on those women for whom the statute
was relevant in order to invalidate Pennsylvania's spousal notification
provision.256 If the identified group included all Mississippi minors,
and the statute operated unconstitutionally only on those minors who,
although they could show that an abortion was in their best interests
could not show that notification was not in their best interests, then
the statute would be constitutional except when applied to this small
subset of Mississippi minors. s7 In contrast, if the group was drawn to
include only those minors within that small subset, the law would be
unconstitutional as to that group in all cases.258
Had the court narrowly defined the group as Justice O'Connor
had in striking down the spousal notification provision in Casey, the
court might have struck the statute. Instead, the court defined the
group broadly and, relying on Salerno's strict standard, upheld the
statute.
In contrast the North Dakota District Court in Fargo 1259 failed
to even reach the issue. The court recited the "heavy burden" im-
posed by Salerno,260 but ultimately relied on similarities between the
challenged statutes and those upheld in Casey. The court concluded
that any differences between the statutes were insufficient to render
the North Dakota law facially invalid.261
254. Id. at 1342 n.5 (quoting id. at 1347 n.10 (Johnson, J., dissenting)).
255. Id. at 1347 n.10 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
256. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
257. Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d at 1342 n.5.
258. Id at 1347 n.10 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
259. 819 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.D. 1993). The challenged statute imposed a 24-hour waiting
period after specified information was provided. Id. at 863.
260. Id. (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745).
261. Id. at 864. ("In light of the Casey Court's holding that statutory provisions nearly
identical to those in the instant case were facially constitutional, the plaintiffs cannot satisfy
the heavy burden required for a successful facial challenge.").
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When Fargo reached the Supreme Court on an application for
stay and injunction pending appeal, 62 Justice O'Connor objected to
the facial challenge standard applied by the district court.263
In my view, the approach taken by the lower courts is incon-
sistent with Casey. In striking down Pennsylvania's spousal-
notice provision, we did not require petitioners to show that
the provision would be invalid in all circumstances. Rather,
we made clear that a law restricting abortions constitutes an
undue burden, and hence is invalid, if, "in a large fraction of
the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion. , 2 4
When Fargo reached the Eighth Circuit on appeal from the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants,2 65 the
court rejected Justice O'Connor's contention that Casey had conclu-
sively modified the facial challenge standard.266 The court therefore
analyzed the challenged provisions under both Salerno and Casey.2 67
The court concluded that similarities between the challenged provi-
sions and those upheld in Casey clearly established that situations ex-
isted wherein the law would be constitutional under Salerno.268
The Eighth Circuit proceeded, in the alternative, to examine
whether the statute was constitutional under Casey. The court first
construed the regulations narrowly, thereby limiting their impact.269
It then considered whether the narrowed provisions imposed an un-
due burden. The court noted the "close similarity" between North
262. Fargo 11, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1668 (1993) (mem.) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
263. I. (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) ("While I express no view as
to whether the particular provisions at issue in this case constitute an undue burden, I
believe the lower courts should have undertaken the same analysis.").
264. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (quoting 'Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2830).
265. Fargo 111, 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994).
266. Id at 529 ("[T]he continuing vitality of Salerno is at least an open question.").
267. See id. at 530-34.
268. Id. at 530.
269. For example, the plaintiffs had argued that the waiting period after receipt of speci-
fied information would result in two or three visits to a medical facility to obtain an abor-
tion. Id. The court construed the statute as not requiring the woman to receive the
information during a personal visit; there was "no language in the statute that prevents a
physician or agent from giving this information over the telephone." Id. at 531. The court
noted that if, however, the statute were interpreted to require two visits, "the facial validity
analysis [would] be entirely different." Id. at 532.
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Dakota's law and the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey. °70 Rely-
ing on these similarities and the court's narrowing construction, the
court determined that the provisions could not constitute an undue
burden.27 ' Thus, under either the old facial challenge standard or
Casey's undue burden standard, the law was constitutional.
I. courts adopting the Casey framework
A few courts have made an effort to apply Casey's facial chal-
lenge standard. In Utah Women's Clinic v. Leavitt 2 72 the Utah Dis-
trict Court abandoned the Salerno facial challenge analysis and
purported to apply the Casey standard to a Utah statute intentionally
modeled after the Pennsylvania provisions upheld in Casey.273 The
court relied on narrowing constructions of the statute274 and similari-
ties to the Pennsylvania statute to uphold both the waiting period and
informed consent provisions.2 75 .
The court observed that Salerno was the traditional standard for
facial challenges, and noted the "high standard of proof" required in
such cases.276 The court acknowledged, however, that the Supreme
Court "seem[ed] to have altered the traditional standard for facial
challenges in the abortion context. 27 7 The Utah District Court recog-
nized that the Casey court struck down Pennsylvania's spousal notifi-
cation provision "not because it was unconstitutional in all
circumstances, but rather because it was unconstitutional 'in a large
fraction of the cases in which [it was] relevant.' 8278 The district court
270. Id.
271. Id. at 533.
272. 844 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994).
273. Id. at 1485-86.
274. A magistrate judge had interpreted the statute to favor its constitutionality, and as
interpreted-to permit telephonic communication to satisfy informed consent require-
ments, for example-most of the plaintiffs' objections were cured. Id. at 1487. Nonethe-
less, the plaintiffs were concerned that future courts would not, in fact, adhere to the
magistrate's interpretation and therefore urged the court to reach the same conclusions.
Id at 1489. The court flatly rejected this approach:
[O]nce it appeared from the Magistrate Judge's virtually unassailable Report and
Recommendation that no finding of unconstitutionality was possible, the plain-
tiffs' tactic became one of obtaining a favorable advisory opinion as to how [the
statute] should be interpreted and enforced, rather than a good faith facial chal-
lenge to its constitutionality.
Id at 1488.
275. Id at 1487-88.
276. Id. at 1488.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1488 n.8 (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830).
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observed that this language left "little guidance as to whether, and
how, the Salerno facial challenge analysis [had] been altered." 279
The Utah court opted to apply Casey. Thus, a statute was an un-
due burden, and hence was unconstitutional, if" 'in a large fraction of
the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial
obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion.' ",280 The court
acknowledged that this new standard changed the focus as to whom
the law affected.2 1 But the court held that, in order to bring a facial
challenge in good faith, "one must reasonably believe that the statute
is incapable of being applied constitutionally in a large fraction of the
cases in which it is relevant."'' 2 The court rejected the possibility that
the plaintiffs could have entertained such a belief.
283
An assumption of possible unconstitutional enforcement
does not justify bringing a facial challenge. A worst-case in-
terpretation may not be used to strike down a statute which
has another plausible constitutional interpretation. Further-
more, as discussed earlier in this opinion, the plaintiffs could
not in any event have argued in good faith that the Utah law
had to allow for telephone communication in order to be
constitutional in light of Casey's constitutional validation of
two face-to-face visits.28
If the plaintiff feared unconstitutional enforcement, the remedy, ac-
cording to the court, was to wait and see if the statute was, in fact,
enforced in an unconstitutional manner and then raise an as applied
challenge.285
Relying on the similarities between the Utah and Pennsylvania
statutes, the court then reached a remarkable conclusion, at least
given Casey's reliance on the factual record: 6 "Under the broad
scope of Casey, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
279. Id. at 1488. The court also observed that the dispute extended to members of the
Supreme Court. Id. at 1488 n.8.
280. Id- at 1489 n.8 (quoting Fargo 11, 113 S. Ct. at 1669 (citation omitted in original)).
281. Id. at 1489.
282. Id.
283. In fact, the court imposed sanctions totaling more than $73,000 in attorney's fees
and court costs, which it has refused to reconsider. See Utah: Judge Refuses to Reconsider
Fees in "Groundless" Suit, AM. PoL. NE-TwoRK, June 24, 1994, available in WL, APN-AB
database.
284. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. at 1489.
285. Id. at 1490.
286. See infra part III.B.2.
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bring a good faith facial challenge to the constitutionality of Utah's 24
hour waiting period/informed consent requirements." 2 7
iii. courts making their own rules
The ambiguity of the facial challenge standard after Casey led the
Utah District Court to adopt a novel approach in Jane L. v.
Bangerter:288 injecting the purpose prong of undue burden analysis 9
to determine whether Casey or Salerno set the applicable facial chal-
lenge standard.290 In the Court's view, because the state's purposes
become even more compelling closer to viability, application of the
more stringent Salerno standard was justified.291 Less compelling pur-
poses at earlier stages of the pregnancy could presumably be analyzed
under Justice O'Connor's broader facial challenge standard.
The court observed that Salerno was the "well-established rule of
the Supreme Court,"2' but noted that the Court had not applied the
rule as such in Casey.293 In some contexts the Utah court observed
that the Casey majority had "abandoned the traditional facial chal-
lenge approach in favor of an undue burden standard. ' 294 In other
contexts, however, the Casey court had not required that the provi-
sion be unconstitutional in all of its applications as required by Sa-
lerno.295 Thus, the district court concluded that it was unclear
whether the majority would apply traditional facial challenge analysis
to all previability, nontherapeutic abortions.296
The question for the Utah court was when-that is, in reference
to which restrictions-Justice O'Connor's modified analysis was appli-
cable. The district court concluded that the traditional Salerno analy-
sis had "forceful application in late abortions at or near the viability
287. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. at 1491.
288. 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992).
289. See infra notes 422-34 and accompanying text.
290. See Jane L., 809 F. Supp. at 871-72.
291. Id at 872.
292. Id at 871.
293. Id
294. Id The court noted that, in evaluating Pennsylvania's 24-hour waiting period, the
Supreme Court apparently combined facial challenge analysis with the undue burden stan-
dard. The Supreme Court did not consider whether the spousal notification statute had
any constitutional applications; rather, the Court focused its inquiry on the narrower group
for whom the law constituted a restriction. Id at 871 n.10; see also id at 876 n.27 (recog-
nizing Casey's limit of inquiry only to group affected by spousal notification statute rather
than Salerno's any set of circumstances approach).
295. Id at 871 & n.10.
296. Id at 872.
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line."'297 Thus, the court upheld a provision requiring that medical
procedures used in a postviability abortion be calculated "to give the
unborn child the 'best chance of survival.' "298 The court noted that
Casey granted states "much greater leeway to pass regulations that
impinge to some degree upon the woman's right to nontherapeutic,
pre-viability abortions.12 99 The court concluded that the devaluation
of the woman's right to choose is further diminished when "the State's
interest in fetal life becomes compelling. ' 300 In the court's analysis,
the provisions were facially valid under Salerno.0 1
The district court also purported to apply the more stringent Sa-
lerno standard to uphold the ban on abortions after twenty-one-weeks
gestation-presumably postviability3°2-because the provision could
be "applied constitutionally in the vast majority of cases. '30 3 The
court concluded that in order to strike the statute, the court would
have to resort to the doctrine of overbreadth, an approach that the
Supreme Court has consistently rejected outside of the First Amend-
ment context.3 °4
The Utah court also applied Salerno to measure whether the "se-
rious medical emergency" exception was unconstitutional on vague-
ness grounds.30 5 The court rejected the challenge, holding that the
plaintiffs were required to prove that the law was "'impermissibly
vague in all of its applications.' "306
297. Id.
298. Id. at 874 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-307 to -308 (Supp. 1991)).
299. Itt at 875.
300. Id. The district court's reasoning was somewhat anachronistic. Casey held that the
state's interest in protecting fetal life was compelling throughout pregnancy, Casey, 112 S.
Ct. at 2816, whereas Roe held that the state's interest became compelling only at viability,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1972).
301. Jane L., 809 F. Supp. at 875-76.
302. Id. at 873 (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 515 (1989)).
303. Id. at 872. It is notable that the court, while professing to apply the Salerno ap-
proach, applied neither Salerno nor Justice O'Connor's modified standard. The court did
not require the plaintiff to prove that no set of circumstances existed in which the statute
could be constitutionally applied. In addition, rather than drawing the group narrowly to
reflect the "group upon whom the statute operates," the court relied on a "vast majority of
cases" standard. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 878. Ultimately, however, the court relied on judicial and legislative actions
construing the statute and Supreme Court decisions upholding similar language. Id. at
878-80 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62
(1971); Casey IV, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791 (1992)).
306. Id. at 878 (citations omitted) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoff-
man Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982)).
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On the other hand, the Utah court seemed to apply Justice
O'Connor's modified facial challenge standard to determine the con-
stitutionality of the regulation that fixed the point of viability at
twenty weeks. 7 The Jane L. court upheld the provision after con-
cluding that locating viability at twenty weeks would neither prevent a
significant number of women from obtaining an abortion nor impose a
substantial obstacle for most women.3 °8 After thus defining the group
upon whom the statute would operate, and determining how the regu-
lation would operate upon that group, the court upheld the
provision.30 9
Justice O'Connor had applied a modified standard to the spousal
notification provisions in Casey, and the Utah court adhered to her
analysis and conclusions in evaluating the analogous Utah provi-
sion.311 "The majority of the Supreme Court ... adopted what
appears to be an unequivocal position on the unconstitutionality
of spousal notification statutes. '31 1 Consequently, the district court
struck down the Utah provision even though it probably would have
survived under the more rigorous Salerno approach.312
An Ohio appellate court, in Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich,313
commented only briefly on the facial challenge standard after Casey.
In a footnote the court described its understanding of the new analy-
sis: "The new undue-burden test appears to be somewhat similar to
that used by courts in determining the constitutionality of a law in its
application to a particular person under special circumstances as op-
posed to determining facial constitutionality of the same law.1
314
The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in Wyoming NARAL v.
Karpan,3 1 5 utilized a Salerno-type analysis to justify including an anti-
abortion initiative on the ballot despite its potential unconstitutional-
307. See id. at 872-73.
308. Id. at 873 (citing Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829).
309. Id. at 873-74.
310. Id. at 876-77. "The Supreme Court in Casey approached the facial challenge of the
Pennsylvania spousal notification statute in a way that seems to avoid the well-established
requirement that the plaintiff "show that no set of circumstances exists under which the
[provision] would be valid."' Id. at 876 n.27 (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2870 (alteration
in original) (citation omitted)).
311. I& at 876-77.
312. See supra part II.D.6.a.
313. 627 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
314. Id. at 576 n.8. The court did not, however, proceed along this route; instead it
reverted to comparing the Ohio statutes at issue to those the Supreme Court upheld in
Casey. Id. at 578.
315. 881 P.2d 281 (Wyo. 1994).
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ity.3 16 "We hold that an initiative, attacked as facially unconstitu-
tional, must be unconstitutional in toto before we could foreclose its
inclusion in the ballot for a vote of the people. '317 Because some as-
pects of the initiative would be constitutional under both the Wyo-ming and federal constitutions,318 the court concluded it could not, in
a pre-enactment ruling, declare the initiative unconstitutional. 31 9
b. confusion in the Supreme Court
The confusion evidenced in the lower courts was also played out
in the Supreme Court. In Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists,320 Justice Scalia expressed concern that lower courts
had misunderstood the intent and effect of Justice O'Connor's opinion
in Casey,321 and denied that Justice O'Connor intended to modify the
standard for facial challenges.3 ' Arguing that Salerno was still the
rule for facial challenges, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority's
denial of certiorari. 3  Justice Scalia maintained that a Guam statute
that outlawed all abortions, except in cases of medical emergencies,
was not unconstitutional on its face because the statute was perfectly
constitutional when applied to postviability abortions.324
316. 1d at 283.
It is clear, and the pro-life faction does not substantially disagree, that the pro-
posed initiative ... is partially unconstitutional under federal standards. In Sec-
tion 35-6-102 of the proposed initiative, abortion is prohibited and, in conjunction
with provisions of existing law, it would be criminalized. This without regard to
the doctrine of Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey. The provisions directly contravene the rule of those cases.
Idl at 287 (citation omitted).
317. Id at 289. Compare the statement in the text with Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 ("A
facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid.").
318. Wyoming NARAL, 881 P.2d at 288.
319. Id. at 289. But see In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. 1992)
(rejecting inclusion of manifestly unconstitutional initiative on ballot), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1028 (1993).
320. 113 S. Ct. 633, 633 (1992) (mem.).
321. I& at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Scalia noted that
the course followed by the Ninth Circuit in striking down Guam's statute, even though it
would be constitutional in at least some applications, had also been followed by the Fifth
Circuit in affirming the facial invalidation of Louisiana's abortion statute in Sojourner T.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing Sojourner T, 974 F.2d 27 (1992)).
322. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
323. Id. at 633-34. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
White. Id. at 633.
324. Id. at 633-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The Casey plurality
also found it constitutionally permissible for states to proscribe postviability abortions ex-
cept where the life or health of the mother was jeopardized. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
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Justice Scalia cited Salerno as the Court's "traditional rule, ''325
and insisted that "[t]he Court did not purport to change this well-es-
tablished rule last Term, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey.3 26  The only exception to Salerno that he
acknowledged was in First Amendment free-speech cases where the
Court has "applied to statutes restricting speech a so-called 'over-
breadth' doctrine, rendering such a statute invalid in all its applica-
tions (i.e., facially invalid) if it is invalid in any of them.
'327
Justice Scalia observed that the Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade
had "seemingly employed an 'overbreadth' approach-though with-
out mentioning the term and without analysis' '32 but argued that this
perspective was rejected-by Justice O'Connor herself-in subse-
quent abortion cases.3 29
Furthermore, Justice Scalia argued that an overbreadth analysis
was inappropriate in the abortion context:
Facial invalidation based on overbreadth impermissibly
interferes with the state process of refining and limiting-
through judicial decision or enforcement discretion-stat-
utes that cannot be constitutionally applied in all cases cov-
ered by their language. And it prevents the State (or
territory) from punishing people who violate a prohibition
that is, in the context in which it is applied, entirely
constitutional.3 0
Justice Scalia's opinion may in fact have been the catalyst that led
Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Fargo 11331 to rebut Justice
Scalia's contention that Salerno remained the prevailing standard. In
the process, however, she also revealed the weakness of her position.
325. Ada, 113 S. Ct. at 633-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745).
326. ld. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
327. l& (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
328. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see supra part II.D.6.b.
329. Ada, 113 S. Ct. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 524 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)). "'[S]ome quite straightforward applications of the
Missouri ban on the use of public facilities for performing abortions would be constitu-
tional and that is enough to defeat appellees' assertion that the ban is facially unconstitu-
tional.'" Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Webster, 492 U.S. at
524 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
330. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
331. 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669 (1993) (mem.) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certio-
rari) ("In striking down Pennsylvania's spousal-notice provision, we did not require peti-
tioners to show that the provision would be invalidated in all circumstances."); see supra
part III.B.l.b.
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Only Justice Souter joined in Justice O'Connor's Fargo II concur-
rence; the other members of the Casey plurality did not.
332
The Court's opinion in Casey was far from unambiguous. The
modified facial challenge was articulated in the limited context of the
spousal notification provisions, and was not explicitly applied to other
regulations. Justice Scalia has made clear that he-and presumably
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White-consider Salerno to be
the appropriate standard.333
However, the makeup of the Court has changed since 1992.
331
The best that can be said is that at least two of the sitting Justices
335
favor a relaxed facial challenge analysis in the abortion context, while
two336 favor the more stringent Salerno approach. The question is
thus far from settled, and the confusion essentially allows the lower
courts to find support for almost any position they care to assume. In
most cases this has proved to be the rigorous Salerno standard.337
2. The undue burden standard and the role of factual evidence
The role of factual evidence is closely intertwined with both facial
challenge and undue burden analyses, and the extent and nature of
the factual evidence received and considered by the court can be dis-
positive.338 The lower courts have struggled to determine when, how,
and to what extent factual findings should be utilized. Casey's undue
burden test looks both to the purpose of an abortion regulation and its
impact on the exercise of the abortion right.339 The district court in
Casey 1114° compiled some 387 findings of fact,341 and the Supreme
Court relied heavily on this factual record-and its own factfinding-
to strike down the spousal notification provision.342 Justice O'Connor
subsequently made clear that her intent in Casey was that a factual
332. Fargo 11, 113 S. Ct. at 1669 (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
333. Ada, 113 S. Ct. at 633-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari, Rehnquist,
C.J. & White, J., joining).
334. Justice Ginsburg replaced Justice White in 1993. Justice Breyer replaced Justice
Blackmun in 1994. WANT's FEDERAL-STATE DmcroRY: 1995 EDTON app. at 214
(Robert S. Want ed., 1994).
335. Justices O'Connor and Souter.
336. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
337. See supra part III.B.l.a.
338. See supra part II.D.5.c.
339. See supra part II.D.5.
340. 744 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Casey IV, 947
F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by Casey V, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
341. Id. at 1329-72.
342. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2827-28; see supra part II.E.3.
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record be developed and considered in evaluating the impact of a par-
ticular regulation. 43
In Casey VIII,344 the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania concluded that it was appropriate to reopen the record
to receive evidence as to the burden imposed in fact by the abortion
regulations upheld by the Supreme Court.3 5 The district court re-
jected defendant's argument that additional evidence was unnecessary
in a facial challenge." 6 Rather, the court observed that the Casey
analysis had been very fact specific, 347 and concluded that "further
evidence could be helpful if it showed that the challenged provisions
placed an undue burden on the women to whom the law is
relevant."'
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision.349 The
court held that the Supreme Court had acted on the merits of the
provisions before it, and that reopening the record on those issues was
therefore inappropriate.350
In Fargo 1351 the North Dakota District Court refused to engage
in " 'a factual assessment of the degree of burden imposed by restric-
tions on the right to choose abortion,' "352 and rejected the assertion
that Casey set forth a new, fact-intensive standard for facial chal-
lenges:353 "Although the temptation is to embark on an analysis of
the new 'undue burden' standard set forth in Casey, the court should
not be asked in a facial challenge to invalidate a legislative act 'based
upon a worst-case analysis that may never occur.' ,,354 The court
claimed to be "not unsympathetic to the burdens a woman may face
when seeking to have an abortion in North Dakota, '3 5 but concluded
that the "'differences between the [North Dakota] and Pennsylvania
343. See Fargo 1H, 113 S. Ct. at 1669 (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
344. 822 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
345. Id. at 235-36.
346. Id. at 235.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Casey IX, 14 F.3d 848, 863 (3d Cir. 1994), stay denied by Casey X, 114 S. Ct. 909,
909 (1994) (Souter, J., as Circuit Justice).
350. Id.
351. Fargo I, 819 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.D. 1993), aff'd, 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994).
352. Id. at 865 (quoting Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 28).
353. Id. at 864 n.2; see supra part ll.D.6.b.
354. Fargo I, 819 F. Supp. at 865 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990)).
355. Id.
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Acts [were] not sufficient to render the former unconstitutional on its
face.' "356
When the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, Justice
O'Connor contested the Third Circuit's conclusion that a factual in-
quiry into the burden an abortion regulation imposed was inappropri-
ate in a facial challenge.357 Justice'O'Connor concurred in the denial
of certiorari, but disapproved of the lower court's analysis. 8 She
noted that the joint opinion in Casey had "specifically examined the
record developed in the district court in determining that Penn-
sylvania's informed-consent provision did not create an undue bur-
den. '359 Although she expressed no view as to whether the particular
provisions of the North Dakota statute constituted an undue burden,
she indicated that "the lower courts should have undertaken the same
analysis."
360
When the district court opinion finally reached the Eighth Circuit
on appeal,361 the court resisted Justice O'Connor's suggestion that it
conduct a factual inquiry into whether North Dakota's provisions con-
stituted an undue burden.362 The court asserted that the "continuing
vitality of Salerno [was] at least an open question. 3 63 Assuming that
Salerno remained the applicable law, factual review was unnecessary
and the facial challenge failed.3 4
Nevertheless, the court considered how Casey's undue burden
test-with its requirement that the specific factual record be re-
viewed-modified the analysis.365 The district court made no factual
findings,366 and the Eighth Circuit rejected a request that the case be
remanded for development of the factual record.367 Plaintiffs had,
however, submitted affidavits and deposition testimony in opposition
to the defendant's motion for summary judgment.368 The court con-
356. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d at 15 (footnote
omitted in original)).
357. Fargo II, 113 S. Ct. at 1669 (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
358. Id (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
359. Id (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (citing Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2825-31).
360. Id.
361. Fargo III, 18 F.3d 526 (1994).
362. Id. at 528-29.
363. Id. at 529.
364. Id. at 530.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 535.
368. Id.
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sidered this evidence, but ultimately concluded that the provisions of
the statute did not constitute an undue burden for women in North
Dakota.369
Despite statements in Casey and Justice O'Connor's concurrence
in Fargo II, the lower courts have been less than enthusiastic in their
willingness to admit and consider factual evidence in abortion cases.
The majority of courts that have considered the role of factual evi-
dence have concluded, consistent with Salerno, that factual evidence is
inappropriate in the context of a facial challenge.370 One court
seemed doubtful that the factual record could ever justify different
conclusions than those reached by the Casey court. 1
The Fifth Circuit in Barnes v. Moore372 rejected evidence that
would have distinguished provisions of the Mississippi Act from those
upheld in Casey.37 3 The court refused to remand for further eviden-
tiary proceedings to allow plaintiffs "to prove that, on its face, the
Mississippi Act pose[d] an 'undue burden' on women seeking abor-
tions in Mississippi.' '374 The court recognized the Casey plurality's re-
liance on the record before it, but concluded that the plurality's intent
to "'set forth a standard of general application'" essentially resolved
the constitutionality of all abortion regulations substantially similar to
those in Casey.375 The court asserted that plaintiffs' argument was es-
sentially reducible "to the aphorism 'Mississippi ain't Penn-
sylvania' ",376 and dismissed it, stating: "This speaks volumes about
the invalidity of [the plaintiffs'] challenge to the Mississippi Act on its
face; in fact, no more really need be said.
'377
Likewise, in Barnes v. Mississippi,378 the Fifth Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the case should be remanded to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing on whether the regulation imposed an
undue burden on minors in Mississippi.37 9 "'Mississippi ain't Penn-
sylvania,' the plaintiffs said .... [But a] facial challenge to a statute
369. Id. at 533.
370. See supra part III.B.1.
371. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. at 1495.
372. 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
373. Id. at 14-15.
374. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
375. Id. (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820).
376. Id. at 15 n.5.
377. Id.
378. 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993).
379. Id. at 1343.
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require[s] more than a derogatory remark and brief about conditions
in Mississippi.
'380
The district court in Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt38' re-
jected outright the plaintiffs' contention that conditions in Utah could
be so different as to merit a different conclusion on regulations pat-
terned after the Pennsylvania statute contested in Casey.38 z The court
considered the role of factual findings, but concluded that the factual
allegations were not materially different than those already consid-
ered by the Supreme Court in Casey.383
Under Casey, however, it was a question for the court to deter-
mine whether the plaintiffs demonstrated that conditions in Utah
were sufficiently different to render the regulation significantly more
burdensome. But, more revealing is the court's suggestion that no
showing was likely to suffice: "Under the broad scope of Casey, it
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to bring a good faith
facial challenge to the constitutionality of Utah's 24 hour waiting pe-
riod/informed consent requirements. '3 4 The court went so far as to
suggest that the action had been brought in bad faith,385 and imposed
sanctions on the plaintiffs.386
The reluctance of lower courts to conduct a fact-specific analysis,
however, ignores the fact that in many states-Utah, 38 7 North Da-
kota,3 8 and Mississippi389 among them-abortion providers may be
few and access limited. Geographic distances are great and travel dif-
ficult. Furthermore, as states accept the invitation to impose increas-
ingly more restrictive regulations in the name of "revaluing the state's
interests," the burden on abortion rights becomes increasingly more
fact specific. The burdens can be different even when the statutes are
identical. Only a review of the factual record will reveal the actual
impact. After all, "Mississippi ain't Pennsylvania!"
380. Id.
381. 844 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994).
382. Id at 1490-91.
383. Id at 1490. "There is nothing significantly different between Utah's [statute] and
the Pennsylvania statute, and there is nothing significantly different in the way in which the
statutes will affect women in Utah as compared to women in Pennsylvania." Id. at 1491.
384. Id.
385. The case had initially been referred to a magistrate judge. See supra note 274 and
accompanying text.
386. See supra note 283.
387. See THE NARAL FouNDATION, supra note 216, at 122-24.
388. Id at 94-96.
389. Id. at 68-69.
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3. Applications of the undue burden standard
As discussed below, many courts have contested Casey's appar-
ent modification of the facial challenge standard, and few have been
willing to accept factual evidence. Similarly, few courts have made the
effort to apply the admittedly ambiguous undue burden test. Under
Casey's reformulated undue burden test, a regulation is unconstitu-
tional if it creates a substantial obstacle to the exercise of the abortion
right.390 "A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclu-
sion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus. ' 391 The Court's tolerance of negative effects in-
creases with the legitimacy of the state's purpose.3 2 Conversely, its
tolerance decreases with suspect or illegitimate purposes.393
Casey, properly applied, requires that a court determine the
state's purpose in enacting the statute, identify the group upon whom
it operates, consider factual evidence as to the statute's actual impact,
and conclude whether it imposes an undue burden. Courts consider-
ing post-Casey cases seem to have rarely undertaken this kind of com-
prehensive analysis. Few have actually attempted to balance the
purpose and the effect as few have been willing to consider factual
evidence. For the most part, the lower courts have looked to textual
similarities between the statute at issue and provisions of the Penn-
sylvania Act upheld in Casey; if the provisions were substantially simi-
lar, the regulation was upheld.3 94
Barnes v. Moore395 is representative of this more limited analysis.
The Fifth Circuit skipped over all evaluation of purpose and effect and
instead relied on similarities between the statute at issue and the
Pennsylvania statute upheld in Casey.396 In this respect, Barnes v.
Moore began a tradition followed by courts in other cases:397 Casey
look-alike statutes that are upheld with minimal review by a lower
390. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
391. 1d. (emphasis added).
392. See supra part II.D.5.a.
393. See supra part II.D.6.b.
394. See supra part lII.B.2.
395. 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (per euriam), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
396. Id. at 14.
397. See supra part llI.B.2.
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federal or state court-a practice that appears contrary to the analysis
suggested by the plurality opinion.
398
Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt,39 9 is another such case. The
federal district court considered the validity of the Utah Abortion Act
Revision,400 a statute intentionally modeled after the Pennsylvania
provisions upheld in Casey.4 °1 The court saw no need to inquire
whether Utah's law was an undue burden, concluding that "[t]he Utah
and Pennsylvania laws are nearly identical .... In those instances
where the laws differ, the Utah law is less restrictive, and places less of
a burden on a woman's right to an abortion.
'40 2
The court considered the factual evidence, but concluded that it
was not materially different from that already considered by the
Supreme Court in Casey. °  Thus, each of plaintiffs' allegations had
been considered and rejected under the undue burden standard al-
ready articulated by the Supreme Court.4° "There is nothing signifi-
cantly different between Utah's [statute] and the Pennsylvania statute,
and there is nothing significantly different in the way in which the stat-
utes will affect women in Utah as compared to women in Penn-
sylvania. ' '40 5 Thus, in the court's view, the plaintiffs had no case:
Where a state passes abortion legislation which is less than or
equal to the restrictions imposed by the Pennsylvania law,
and where the plaintiffs are unable to allege any impact from
the legislation which is more burdensome than was found by
the district court in Casey, there is no viable legal cause of
action.
406
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller,407 a
South Dakota court purported to apply Casey, but, rather than engag-
ing in an undue burden analysis, actually decided the case based on its
similarity to other statutes. Plaintiffs challenged a South Dakota law
requiring a minor seeking an abortion to provide written notice to one
398. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2826 ("Hence, on the record before us, and in the context
of this facial challenge, we are not convinced that the 24-hour waiting period constitutes an
undue burden.").
399. 844 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994).
400. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305 (1990).
401. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. at 1485-86.
402. Id at 1486. As an example, the court cited the Utah statute which did not require a
physician to provide initial abortion information as did the Pennsylvania statute. Id.
403. Id at 1490.
404. Id at 1490-91.
405. Id at 1491.
406. Id.
407. 860 F. Supp. 1409 (D.S.D. 1994).
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parent forty-eight hours in advance of the procedure. The law also
imposed a twenty-four-hour waiting period after the minor received
the specified information from a doctor.4 °8 The law did not include a
judicial-bypass mechanism.4 °9
The district court made findings of "undisputed" fact that (1) the
plaintiff doctor was the only abortion provider in South Dakota;
(2) the plaintiff doctor was the only abortion provider in any state
within a 235-mile radius of Sioux Falls; (3) seventeen percent of South
Dakotan women receiving abortions travel at least 300 miles, one way;
(4) twenty-five percent of the plaintiff doctor's patients were below
the federal poverty level; (5) two days' absence to obtain an abortion
causes a loss of wages and an increase in expenses; and (6) a tele-
phone interview to provide required information would take between
three and fifteen minutes per patient.410 Despite this record, the court
ultimately relied entirely on determinations of constitutionality made
by other courts rather than its own application of the undue burden
test to the factual record before it.
411
The court also relied on precedent when it rejected the one-par-
ent notification requirement without a judicial bypass. 412 Rather than
weighing the state's purpose against the provision's effects based on
the factual record, the court simply concluded that pre-Casey author-
ity required any parental notice provision to have a bypass mecha-
nism, ensuring that "parental notice does not amount in fact to a
parental veto. ''4 13 Because the South Dakota law did not include such
a mechanism, the "omission constitute[d] an undue burden on the mi-
nor's privacy right to make the abortion decision. 41 4
The informed consent and twenty-four-hour waiting period provi-
sions were likewise upheld without any real analysis under the undue
burden test. The court noted that informed consent was required for
medical procedures under common law,415 and that cases after Casey
had found informed consent provisions like South Dakota's to be con-
408. Id. at 1411 n.1, 1412 n.2. Both provisions contained a medical emergency exception
and an additional provision provided for a civil penalty against any doctor who performed
an abortion without informed consent. Id. at 1413 & n.6.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1413-14.
411. See id. at 1415.
412. Id.
413. IH (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)).
414. Miller, 860 F. Supp. at 1416.
415. Id at 1418.
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stitutional.41 6 With no analysis of the factual record, the court also
concluded that the effect of South Dakota's provision was "substan-
tially similar to the impact found by the district court in Casey. 3417
The requirement that doctors provide telephonic or in-person in-
formation prior to consent provides the most striking example of how
applying the undue burden test to specific factual circumstances could
lead to a different result. While the regulation enacted in South Da-
kota might result in a constitutional application in a state with more
doctors who perform abortions, its application in South Dakota could
have resulted in an undue burden because South Dakota had only one
abortion doctor. Plaintiffs contended that requiring that doctor to
provide the specified information would take seven hours a week and
result in an increased cost of $60 per abortion, even if the information
was to be provided by telephone.418 The district court nevertheless
relied on Casey's determination that requiring a doctor to provide
such information was not an undue burden. 419
In Jane L. v. Bangerter,42 the Utah District Court also relied on
constitutional determinations made in Casey to strike down an uncon-
ditional previability ban on abortions, noting that "[m]anifestly, the
outright ban... on abortions by demand prior to the 21 week gesta-
tion age would constitute departure from 'the essence of Roe's origi-
nal decision,' affirmed by the dicta of the majority in Casey."42 The
court also struck down Utah's spousal notification provision despite
the defendants' efforts to distinguish the statute from that in Casey.
However, the court rejected the contention that Casey might require
the undue burden test to be applied anew in Utah; concluding that
"[t]he majority of the Supreme Court... adopted what appears to be
an unequivocal position on the unconstitutionality of spousal notifica-
tion statutes." 422
The district court did, however, consider whether statutorily lo-
cating the viability line at twenty weeks might constitute an "undue
burden."423 Looking to the record before it, the court considered the
416. lIL at 1419 (citing Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2826; Fargo 111, 18 F.3d at 530; Barnes v.
Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 15 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992)).
417. Miller, 860 F. Supp. at 1419.
418. Id at 1420.
419. IL at 1421.
420. 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992).
421. Id. at 870.
422. Ie at 876-77.
423. Id. at 873.
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impact of the statute on the exercise of the right to abortion.4 24 Be-
cause the record demonstrated a lack of impact, the court concluded
that the statutory provision was "not 'likely to prevent a significant
number of women from obtaining an abortion,' nor [could] it be found
that 'for many women, it [would] impose a substantial obstacle.' "425
Furthermore, the court noted that Casey had "fixed the point of via-
bility as a fair and appropriate line of demarcation wherein the inter-
est of the State in unborn children exceeds the liberty interest of a
woman in the abortion choice. ' 42 6 Thus, in the court's view, the provi-
sion was consistent with the language of Casey, did not constitute an
undue burden, and was constitutional regardless of whether the fetus
was viable at twenty weeks or not.427
The Jane L. court then considered the facial validity of a provi-
sion that required a doctor to use medical procedures and skills in a
postviability abortion that would give the fetus the best chance of sur-
vival.428 The court asserted that Casey granted states "much greater
leeway to pass regulations that impinge to some degree upon the wo-
man's right to non-therapeutic, previability abortions." 429 Conse-
quently, the "decreased weight given to the woman's right to abortion,
extend[ed] with even more force into the area of postviability abor-
tions where the State's interest in fetal life becomes compelling.
'430
The court thus concluded that the postviability provision was facially
valid and bore a "rational relationship to the legitimate state interest
in preservation of viable fetal life."'431 The court's conclusion may in
fact be valid under Casey since the plurality only applied the undue
burden analysis to weigh the constitutionality of previability abor-
tions 432
In contrast, in Planned Parenthood v. Neely,433 a district court ac-
tually attempted to apply the undue burden test to determine whether
the judicial-bypass mechanism of Arizona's parental consent provision
424. IM The record reflected that nontherapeutic abortions were not performed after
20 weeks; the submitted evidence did not indicate that women wanted such late, nonthera-
peutic abortions. d
425. L (citations omitted).
426. I& at 872.
427. Id. at 873-74.
428. Id. at 874 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-307 to -308 (Supp. 1991)).
429. Id at 875.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 875-76.
432. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820-21.
433. 804 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Ariz. 1992).
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was constitutionally sufficient.4" In Casey the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's parental consent statute was "based on the reasonable
assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with their par-
ents."435 The Neely court did not dispute the legitimacy of that inter-
est. However, the court held that the state's interests "will not
outweigh the privacy interests of minors to the extent that the State
will be given unfettered discretion.""436 The court concluded that the
undue burden standard was an appropriate mechanism to reconcile
the minor's constitutionally protected liberty with the state's
interest.437
Although the court found the statute unconstitutional on other
grounds, it pressed on to express its opinion on the constitutionality of
the judicial-bypass provision under an undue burden analysis "[i]n an
effort to avoid future litigation.1438 The court carried forward Casey's
determination that the state had a legitimate interest in ensuring that
minors make an informed choice regarding abortion.439 It then con-
sidered the negative impact of the statute.440 The court concluded
that the appeal requirement amounted to an undue burden based on
plaintiffs' common sense argument that the procedural requirements
imposed substantial obstacles. 4 1 Likewise, the court determined that
the statute's requirement that the minor request the appointment of
an attorney was more restrictive than the parallel Casey provision,
which allowed the court to appoint a guardian ad litem to advise the
minor of her right to appointed counsel." 2 As a result, the district
court determined that the judicial-bypass provision was also
unconstitutional." 3
434. Id at 1211. The statute required the minor to obtain the consent of one parent
before undergoing an abortion except in medical emergencies and subject to a judicial-
bypass mechanism. Amz. R-v. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2152 to -2153 (1993).
435. Neely, 804 F. Supp. at 1212 (citing Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830).
436. Id
437. Id.
438. Id at 1216.
439. See id. at 1212.
440. The Arizona law required a minor to file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
court within 24 hours of receiving the trial court's denial of her judicial-bypass petition.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(C).
441. The court did not refer to any findings of fact or evidence presented. Neely, 804 F.
Supp. at 1217. Plaintiffs claimed that, in addition to the difficulty of notifying a minor
attempting to obtain an abortion without her parent's knowledge of an adverse decision,
an unrepresented minor is unlikely to be able to decipher her appeal rights and correctly
prepare and file the notice within 24 hours. Id
442. Id.
443. Id at 1216.
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Neely represented one of the few lower court opinions that con-
sidered the relationship between purpose and effect. The court recog-
nized that the state had a legitimate interest in encouraging minors to
consult with their parents, but looked beyond that purpose to the im-
pact the statute imposed on the affected minors."' Under this analy-
sis, the statute would have also failed.
Justice Stevens also recognized that the undue burden test implic-
itly requires a balancing of purpose and effect. Dissenting in Benten v.
Kessler, 45 Justice Stevens also suggested that the undue burden analy-
sis extends beyond the traditional "abortion regulation" context.446
Benten involved the importation of RU486, an abortifacient banned
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).4 4 7 The FDA seized the
drug when one plaintiff attempted to import it for personal use.448
The district court entered a preliminary injunction ordering the FDA
to release the drug to her, but the Second Circuit granted a stay.449
Justice Stevens's two-paragraph dissent to the denial of an appli-
cation to'vacate the stay contended that the government's seizure of
RU486 constituted an undue burden on the right to choose abor-
tion.450 Justice Stevens described the balancing required under the
undue burden analysis: "Whether an undue burden has been imposed
on the exercise of a constitutional right depends on the relative signifi-
cance of the burden, on the one hand, and the governmental interest
at stake, on the other."' 451 He noted that the government action in-
volved in banning and seizing RU486 did not obstruct the woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy, only her choice of the method for
doing so. 4
52
Referring to the FDA manual which set the relevant policy, Jus-
tice Stevens identified the relevant governmental interest as avoiding
444. See id at 1212, 1216-17.
445. 112 S. Ct. 2929, 2930 (1992) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of
application to vacate stay).
446. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate stay).
447. Id at 2930. An abortifacient is "a drug or other agent that induces abortion."
WEBsTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 5 (1976).
448. Id
449. Id Plaintiffs contended that "the administrative document instructing enforcement
officials to seize the drug was promulgated without notice-and-comment procedures...
required under both the Administrative Procedure Act and FDA regulations." Id.
450. Id at 2930-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate stay).
451. Id. at 2930 (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate stay).
452. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate stay).
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drugs that present known serious health risks.453 He noted the per-
sonal use exception, and categorized that purpose as legitimate.454 He
further noted that there was no evidence on the record that the wo-
man faced a significant health risk from RU486, and was "persuaded
that the relevant legitimate federal interest [was] not sufficient to jus-
tify the burdensome consequence of this seizure."455
C. A Standard of General Application-Nonabortion Applications
of Casey
When the Casey plurality announced the undue burden test, it
declared: "[W]e set forth a standard of general application to which
we intend to adhere. '45 6 Although the Court made this statement in
reviewing the undue burden concept in other abortion cases,457 it is
unclear whether the plurality intended the "standard of general appli-
cation" to apply outside the abortion context. The scope of the undue
burden test is broad enough to encompass a regulation affecting the
right to privacy, or even any fundamental right.
Whatever its intended scope, a few later cases have applied the
undue burden test in nonabortion right of privacy cases.458 Several
courts have addressed the applicability of Casey's undue burden test
in challenges to the constitutionality of legislation regulating assisted
suicide. The District Court for the Western District of Washington
undertook one of the more complete applications in just such a
case.459 Two other courts also recognized that regulations affecting
the privacy right of family association may implicate the undue burden
test. However, Casey was tangential to the primary analysis in each of
those cases. Whether other lower courts will continue to expand the
scope of cases to which the undue burden test applies, and whether
the Supreme Court will approve of such applications, remains to be
seen.
453. Id. at 2930-31 & n.* (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate
stay).
454. Id. at 2930-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate stay).
455. Id. at 2931 (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate stay).
456. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
457. Id.
458. See infra part 1H.C.1-2.
459. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994);
infra part Im.C.1.
Arl1995] 1029
1030 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
1. Right to assisted suicide cases
In Compassion in Dying v. Washington,460 patients, doctors, and a
nonprofit organization which provided information and counseling to
terminally ill patients considering suicide challenged the constitution-
ality of a Washington statute that criminalized physician-assisted sui-
cide. In reviewing the parties' motions for summary judgment, the
district court applied a full Casey undue burden analysis once it deter-
mined that a due process right to assisted suicide existed.46'
The court first addressed the question of whether mentally com-
petent, terminally ill adults had a constitutionally protected interest in
assisted suicide under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.462 Casey was "highly instructive and almost prescrip-
tive" to the court on this question.463 First, Casey was one of a long
line of cases recognizing constitutional protection for personal deci-
sions such as those involving marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education.464 Second, a termi-
nally ill patient's decision to commit suicide, like the right reaffirmed
in Casey, implicated matters
"involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy [which] are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."
'465
The court concluded that "the suffering of a terminally ill person
cannot be deemed any less intimate or personal, or any less deserving
of protection from unwarranted governmental interference, than that
of a pregnant woman." 466 Thus, the decision fell within the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause. 67
Next, the district court decided what standard was applicable in a
facial challenge to a statute regulating assisted suicide.468 Defendants
460. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
461. d. at 1459-61.
462. Id. at 1459.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807).
466. Id. at 1460. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990), provided additional authority for the court's decision. Compassion in Dying, 850 F.
Supp. at 1461-62.
467. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1460.
468. Id. at 1462-64.
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asserted that Salerno's no set of circumstances test controlled, 469 but
"[t]he court conclude[d] that the Casey 'undue burden' standard, set
forth by the Supreme Court five years after Salerno, control[led] in
this case."'4 7 The court reviewed the Fifth Circuit decision in Barnes
v. Moore,471 the Third Circuit decision in Casey IX,472 Justice Souter's
denial of the application for a stay of that decision,473 Justice
O'Connor's denial of application for a stay and injunction pending
appeal in Fargo 1,474 and the Eighth Circuit's subsequent decision in
Fargo III.47 The court concluded that Casey set the appropriate stan-
dard for facial challenges and was intended to be a standard of general
application, and proceeded to apply the undue burden analysis.476
In a uniquely intelligible application of the undue burden test, the
district court first identified and classified the relevant state inter-
ests.477 Next it confronted whether the Washington statute had the
purpose or effect of substantially blocking the exercise of the right to
choose suicide.478
Defendants argued that the statute prevented suicide and pro-
tected those at risk of suicide from undue influence.47 9 The court ac-
knowledged only that the state had a "strong, legitimate interest in
deterring suicide by young people and others with a significant natural
life span ahead of them. ' 480 However, the court decided that this le-
gitimate interest was "not abrogated by allowing mentally competent,
terminally ill patients to freely and voluntarily commit physician-as-
sisted suicide."'481 As to protecting those susceptible to suicide from
undue influence, the court found it to be an unquestionably legitimate
purpose.4s2 But again the court found the legitimate purpose inappli-
cable in this context because those "who make knowing and voluntary
469. Id. at 1462 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
470. Id.
471. 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (per euriam), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
472. 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994), stay denied by Casey X, 114 S. Ct. 909, 909 (1994) (Sou-
ter, J., as Circuit Justice).
473. Casey X, 114 S. Ct. 909, 912 (1994) (Souter, J., as Circuit Justice).
474. Fargo 11, 113 S. Ct. 1668,1669 (1993) (mem.) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
475. Fargo 11I, 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994).
476. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1463-64.
477. Id. at 1464-65.
478. Id. at 1464-66.
479. Id. at 1464.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 1465.
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choices to commit physician-assisted suicide by definition fall outside
the realm of the State's concern.
'483
Given the questionable legitimacy of the state's purposes when
applied to those for whom the right to choose assisted suicide exists-
terminally ill, mentally competent patients-the court then reviewed
the effect of the Washington ban on physician-assisted suicide. In that
the exercise of the right was absolutely prohibited, the court easily
concluded that it was unduly burdensome.484 The court left open the
possibility that the state could constitutionally further its stated pur-
poses through regulation of assisted suicide, so long as those regula-
tions did not pose an undue burden.485
On March 9, 1995, the Ninth Circuit reversed because it held that
there was no liberty interest in assisted suicide under the Fourteenth
Amendment.486 The court rejected the idea that Casey's language re-
garding "personal dignity and autonomy" and "the right to define
one's own concept of existence" could be used, as the district court
had used it, to identify other, non-abortion liberty interests protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.487 The dissent contended that Casey
did define the scope of liberty interests, and stated that the above lan-
guage was not limited to the abortion context.4m
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the district court's application of
Casey's facial challenge standard and stated that the traditional Sa-
lerno standard was the applicable measure.489 The court further criti-
cized the lower court, stating that even under the Casey facial
challenge standard the statute would be constitutional because it
"conceded that there were circumstances in which the statute could
operate constitutionally" and did not attempt to calculate the fraction
of cases in which it would operate unconstitutionally. 490 The court
also faulted the lower court for failing to adequately consider the
state's interest in preventing suicide and elaborated on those interests
in detail.49'
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. I& at 1466.
486. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. 94-35534, 1995 WL 94679, at *3 (9th Cir.
Mar. 9, 1995).
487. Id. (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807).
488. Ia& at *9 (Wright, J., dissenting).
489. I1& at *5.
490. Id.
491. 1&. at *5-7.
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The dissent would have recognized the right as fundamental, and
reviewed the assisted suicide ban under a strict scrutiny standard.49
Though the dissent recognized it was confronting a facial challenge, it
would have only invalidated the statute as applied to "terminally ill,
mentally competent adults."4 93
State courts in Michigan also grappled with the applicability of
Casey's undue burden standard. However, the district court's ap-
proach in the first Compassion in Dying case was not ultimately ac-
cepted by the Supreme Court of Michigan. The state trial court in
Hobbins v. Attorney General494 first dealt with Michigan's law
criminalizing assisted suicide. The court granted a preliminary injunc-
tion, finding that two terminally ill patients had met their "burden of
demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on
their claim of a liberty interest in the ending of their own lives."49 5
The court first reviewed cases regarding the existence of a constitu-
tionally protected right to die, and seemed to conclude that such a
right exists without specifically classifying it as fundamental.496
The court's discussion of Casey was neither extensive nor particu-
larly coherent. The court did state, however, that "[i]f one finds the
right to bodily integrity to be a fundemental [sic] right then the test as
to any infringement on that right is articulated in Planned
Parenthood-V-Casey. '497  Furthermore, the court recognized the
state's interest in preserving life, but noted that "states [cannot] place
an undue burden on the right holder in furtherance of societal
goals." 498
Finally, the court concluded that, having found a right to die, it
was "left to consider whether the statute places an undue burden or
restriction on that right."4 99 However, "without the full development
of a record on such issues as what means are available to the handi-
capped to effectuate this right without assistance," the court could not
492. Id. at *10 (Wright, J., dissenting).
493. Id. at *11 (Wright, J., dissenting).
494. No. 93-306-178 C2, 1993 WL 276833 (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 20, 1993), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part by 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub
nom. People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752, 99758 & 99759, 1994 WL 700448
(Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (mem.).
495. Id. at *7.
496. Id. at *8-9.
497. Id. at *9.
498. I.
499. Id
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make a conclusive determination.500 The court granted the injunction
to allow the development of such a factual record."'
The constitutionality of the same Michigan statute was again ad-
dressed six months later in People v. Kevorkian.50 2 This court found a
right to suicide, and to some extent applied Casey's undue burden test
after a criminal defendant challenged the statute when he was prose-
cuted for its violation.0 3 The court found the right to commit "ra-
tional" suicide to be similar to the right in Casey in that it also
involved an intimate and personal choice that "ranks among the most
important that a person may make concerning one's own being."5°4
The court classified the state's interest in protecting life as "rec-
ognizable," 0 5 and applying Casey's undue burden standard, consid-
ered "whether the blanket proscription [on assisted suicides] unduly
burdens a person's right to commit rational suicide. 50 6 The court
found the statute unconstitutional.5 °7 The court examined the effect
of the Michigan ban on the right to rational suicide, and found that on
the basis of negligible evidence "[i]t [was] hard to imagine a state ac-
tion that would have a greater intrusive effect upon a person's quest to
make personal decisions based upon their personal moral beliefs"
than the ban in question. 08
The Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed both of these decisions
in one opinion and held that the ban violated a provision of the Michi-
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1993), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nor. Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nor. People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752,
99758 & 99759, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (mem.).
503. 1d. at *19.
504. Id at *14. The court specifically found a constitutionally protected right
when a person's quality of life is significantly impaired by a medical condition and
the medical condition is extremely unlikely to improve, and that person's decision
to commit suicide is a reasonable response to the condition causing the quality of
life to be significantly impaired, and the decision to end one's life is freely made
without undue influence, such a person has a constitutionally protected right to
commit suicide.
Id. at *19 (footnote omitted).
505. ld. at *14.
506. ld. at *19.
507. Id.
508. Id. The court's conclusion that many doctors believe that the decision is for the
patient to make, not the state, was based entirely on a doctor's testimony that "many, if not
most" doctors accept that suicide may be the best option for a given patient. Id. The court
declared, in marked contrast to the Casey plurality's sometimes detailed examination of
the factual record, that a "litany of the impact upon a person and their family [if the ban is
permitted] is, probably, both obvious and unnecessary." Id.
[Vol. 28:971
CON LAW IS AS CON LAW DOES
gan Constitution.5 0 9 Though the court recognized that it need not ad-
dress whether Michigan's assisted suicide ban also violated the federal
constitution,5 1 0 it concluded that no due process privacy right existed
in the right to commit suicide or assisted suicide. 1' One judge
dissented from this latter part of the majority's decision and con-
cluded that the Compassion in Dying court was correct in that Justice
O'Connor's description of liberty in Casey was as applicable to the
right to die as it was to the right to choose abortion.512 Furthermore,
this dissent concluded that some state regulation of the right would be
permissible under Casey, but that an absolute ban was imper-
missible.5
13
Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court issued a memorandum
opinion with the bare conclusion that Michigan's assisted suicide ban
did not violate either the Michigan Constitution or the federal consti-
tution.514 Two dissenting justices concluded that the assisted suicide
ban would violate the federal Due Process Clause.51 5 One dissenting
justice identified the right of competent, terminally ill patients to com-
mit assisted suicide using the "reasoned judgment" approach to the
identification of due process rights suggested by Casey,516 and agreed
that restrictions on this right "should be evaluated according to the
undue burden standard enunciated in Casey. ' 517 The other dissenting
justice concluded that "[a]s in Casey, an infringement of a fundamen-
tal right by the state that completely bars the exercise of that right
cannot pass constitutional muster. '5 18
2. Right of family association cases
Another nonabortion setting in which Casey was employed in-
volved the right to family association. In Griffin v. Strong,"1 9 the court
presided over a mother's civil rights action against a police officer and
509. Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W2d 487,491 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part sub nom. People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752, 99758 & 99759,
1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (mem.).
510. lId at 492.
511. Id. at 493-94.
512. Id. at 495-98 (Sheldon, J., dissenting).
513. l& at 499 (Sheldon, J., dissenting).
514. People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752, 99758 & 99759, 1994 WL 700448
(Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (mem.).
515. Itt. at *27 (Levin, J., dissenting), *32 (Mallett, J., dissenting).
516. It. at *29-30 (Levin, J., dissenting).
517. lId at *32 (Levin, J., dissenting).
518. Id. at *36 (Mallett, J., dissenting).
519. 983 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1993).
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a social worker. The mother brought suit for violation of her due pro-
cess right to familial association after her husband was investigated on
allegations of child abuse. 2° The court stated that "classic fourteenth
amendment liberty analysis" required it to balance "the state's inter-
ests in investigating reports of child abuse" against the plaintiff's in-
terbst in the familial right of association.5 21 The court stated that it
weighed these interests "in light of the facts of this particular case '"5 22
to determine if the government's conduct unduly burdened the plain-
tiff's right.5z Though the Griffin court referenced Casey regarding
the undue burden determination, it was a "see also" citation tacked
onto the end of three other cases in a string cite,524 and the court did
not actually apply Casey's undue burden test.5 25
In a case that focused on infringement, Herndon v. Tuhey,526 the
Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the constitutionality of a state
law that permitted a court to give grandparents visitation rights with
their grandchildren. The court cited Justice O'Connor's dissent in Ak-
ron for the proposition that state interference must heavily burden a
right before strict scrutiny will be applied.5 27 Applying the Akron
framework, the court found that because the magnitude of the in-
fringement of the parents' rights was not severe, the law was not an
unreasonable attempt to strengthen the family.51 Herndon was sur-
prising in that while the court realized that Casey altered the Akron
framework 52 -it apparently did not recognize that the undue burden
tests in the two opinions are significantly different. The application of
Casey's undue burden test was not well developed as to the right of
family association. If the Casey plurality truly set out a standard of
general application, later courts may yet address such regulations in
full under the undue burden test.
520. Id. at 1545.
521. Id. at 1547.
522. 1&
523. Id
524. Id. at 1547-48.
'525. Id. at 1548-49.
526. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
527. IM at 208-09 (citing Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416,461-63
(1983), overruled by Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)).
528. Id. at 210.
529. Id. at 212 (citing Akron's subsequent history in footnote).
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D. Cases Decided on State Constitutional Grounds
Some courts have refused to rely on the undue burden standard
of Casey, looking instead to their state constitutions to resolve the
constitutionality of abortion regulations and reaching disparate con-
clusions. Because a state can grant greater individual rights under its
state constitution than are recognized under the federal constitution,
it is possible for a state to afford greater protection to the woman's
freedom in the abortion decision. 3 °
In Pretern Cleveland v. Voinovich 5 3 1 an Ohio appellate court ap-
plied Casey in determining whether Ohio abortion regulations were
constitutional under the Ohio Constitution.532 As an initial matter,
the court observed that it was free, under the Ohio Constitution, to
grant greater rights to individuals than provided by the U.S. Constitu-
tion. 33 The court further noted that the Ohio Constitution had been
interpreted to grant "broader" protection to individual liberties in that
it appeared to recognize so-called natural law .5 1 Nevertheless, the
court determined that the Ohio Constitution granted no greater rights
in this situation and thus was bound by the undue burden standard of
Casey.53 5 The court compared the Ohio statutes at issue to those up-
held in Casey: 36 "We are unable to distinguish the Ohio statutes from
the Pennsylvania statutes involved in [Casey] and find no basis for
determining [that the Ohio Constitution] imposes greater restrictions
upon the state than are imposed by the U.S. Constitution as construed
by the plurality opinion in [Casey]. 537
In contrast, a Michigan circuit court determined that Casey was
not controlling in Mahaffey v. Attorney General.5 8 The court re-
viewed the Michigan Constitution and Michigan case law and con-
cluded that, "Without hesitation, this Court is of the opinion that
under our state constitution the right of privacy is 'fundamental.' ,,539
The court determined that the appropriate standard of review for fun-
530. See, e.g., Hope v. Perales, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948, 952 (App. Div. 1993).
531. 627 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
532. Id. at 573.
533. Ld. at 573-74.
534. Id. at 574.
535. Id. at 577. But see Mahaffey v. Attorney Gen., No. 94-406793 AZ, 1994 WL
394970 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 15, 1994) (holding anti-abortion statute constitutional under
Michigan Constitution).
536. Pretern Cleveland, 627 N.E.2d at 578.
537. Id.
538. No. 94-406793 AZ, 1994 WL 394970 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 15, 1994).
539. Id. at *4.
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damental rights under the state constitution was "strict scrutiny,"
rather than Casey's undue burden analysis.540 Consequently, the
court rejected defendant's argument that a statutory provision that
imposed informed consent and a twenty-four-hour waiting period
prior to performance of an abortion was supported by compelling
state interests.541
State courts have also considered how Casey impacts state initia-
tive proposals restricting abortion rights. In In re Initiative Petition
No. 349,542 a divided Oklahoma Supreme Court considered whether
an initiative petition restricting abortion should be permitted to ap-
pear on the ballot when it was manifestly evident that the provisions,
if enacted, would be unconstitutional.543 The court held that Casey
was controlling.544 The court observed that a state could grant greater
rights under its state constitution, but that it could not curtail rights
granted under the U.S. Constitution.54 5
In a juxtaposition of the usual argument, the initiative's propo-
nents argued that the provisions were different from those in Casey,
and thus Casey was not controlling.546 The court agreed: It was so
much more restrictive than Casey, it could not survive constitutional
muster.547
In Hope v. Perales,.a8 the New York court looked to its state con-
stitution, rather than to Casey to evaluate a statute that funded prena-
tal and postpartum care for low-income women, but did not provide
funding for abortions even if medically necessary.5 49 The court relied
on an "independent and expansive construction of the state constitu-
540. Id. at *5.
541. Id. at *4-7.
542. 838 P2d 1 (Okla. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993).
543. Id at 2-3. The initiative absolutely prohibited abortions except in four narrow cir-
cumstances: (1) grave impairment of the female's physical or mental health; (2) rape; (3)
incest; or (4) grave physical or mental defect of the fetus. Id at 6 (citing Initiative Petition
No. 349, § 5).
544. Id. at 12.
545. Id.
546. Id. at 11.
547. Id. The court also refused to sever the unconstitutional provisions, maintaining
that severance would render the remainder of the initiative meaningless. Id. at 7. It would
essentially amount to "an expensive, non-binding public opinion poll," and the court re-
fused to permit a "costly, fruitless, and useless election." Id. But see Wyoming NARAL v.
Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 293 (Wyo. 1994) (upholding inclusion of initiative on ballot despite
admittedly unconstitutional provisions.).
548. 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1993).
549. Prenatal Care Assistance Program (PCAP), N.Y. Ptm. HF-ALTH LAw §§ 2520-2529
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1995).
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tion,"5 0 and determined that although the law did not prohibit a wo-
man from obtaining an abortion "the fact is that poor women have
more circumscribed options... and the effect is certainly to pressure
women in the direction of giving birth, thereby limiting the reproduc-
tive freedom of those women."5s5 The court found that the state's
interest in health, mothers, and babies had no reasonable relationship
to the exclusion of abortion in the funding law."52 Funding provisions
were not at issue in Casey, but the court's increased valuation of the
state's interest in fetal rightsS 3 would likely have led the Court to up-
hold the New York provisions at issue in Hope. By relying on its state
constitution, the New York court was able to strike the statute.
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n554 was not an abortion
case; at issue was a drug testing program imposed on college ath-
letes.555 The challenge, however, was based on the privacy provision
of the California Constitution,5 56 and the opinion represents the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's most current pronouncement on the state of
privacy rights in California.557
As an initial matter, the court noted that the "murky character of
federal constitutional privacy analysis" 55 8 lacks "any coherent legal
definition or standard. ' 559 Citing Casey for the observation that the
U.S. Supreme Court "has not endorsed strict scrutiny for all privacy-
based interests at all conceivable levels of intrusion,5 60 the court re-
jected the contention that every assertion of a privacy interest must be
overcome by a "compelling" state interest.561 Instead, the nature of
550. Hope, 595 N.Y.S2d at 952.
551. I& at 951.
552. Id, at 952-53.
553. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816.
554. 7 Cal. 4th 1, 865 P.2d 633, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (1994).
555. Id. at 9, 865 P.2d at 637, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838.
556. 1& Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution provides: "'All people are
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying
and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.'" Id. at 15, 865 P.2d at 641, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 842 (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 1). The final two words, "and
privacy," were added pursuant to a voter initiative in 1972. Id.
557. For a comprehensive review of privacy rights in California under both the common
law and the California Constitution, see id. at 20-35, 865 P.2d at 644-54,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
845-56.
558. Id. at 31, 865 P.2d at 651, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 853.
559. Id. at 30, 865 P2d at 651, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852.
560. Id. at 31, 865 P.2d at 651, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 853.
561. Id. at 34-35, 865 P.2d at 654, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855-56. It is beyond the scope of
this Comment to analyze the history of California's privacy jurisprudence. It should be
noted, however, that when the court suggests that an infringement of a privacy interest
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the privacy interest involved, the nature and seriousness of the inva-
sion, and any countervailing interests must be properly considered.56
Where the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest
fundamental to personal autonomy, e.g., freedom from invol-
untary sterilization or the freedom to pursue consensual fa-
milial relationships, a "compelling interest" must be present
to overcome the vital privacy interest. If, in contrast, the pri-
vacy interest is less central, or in bona fide dispute, general
balancing tests are employed.563
The court thereby rejected the compelling interest test of its prior
privacy jurisprudence in favor of a new legal framework. In order to
make out a prima facie case of invasion of privacy, the plaintiff must
show a legally protected privacy interest, a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and a serious invasion of that right.564 Once the plaintiff
makes this showing, the court balances the plaintiff's interest against
any competing or countervailing interests.565 Finally, the plaintiff may
prove that other alternatives would minimize the intrusion.566
As a balancing test, the general structure of the Hill court's anal-
ysis is at least reminiscent of the undue burden standard of Casey.
The Supreme Court balanced the woman's right to privacy-her right
to choose abortion-against the state's competing interests in fetal
health, informed choice, and the health of the mother.567 The Califor-
nia and U.S. Supreme Courts have divergent viewpoints from which
they conduct their analyses. The California Supreme Court starts
from the privacy interest and proceeds to the state purpose. The un-
due burden standard of Casey, on the other hand, starts with the state
purpose and balances that against the impact on the privacy inter-
must be justified by a "compelling" state interest, it is not suggesting that simple articula-
tion of that interest is sufficient to justify the infringement. Thus, even a compelling inter-
est must be balanced against the intrusion it imposes.
562. Id. at 34, 865 P.2d at 653, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855.
563. I&
564. Id at 35-37, 865 P.2d at 654-55,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856-57. The dissenting opinions
criticize the new framework as undermining privacy interests by elevating the considera-
tions embodied in the second and third elements: reasonable expectation of privacy and
"serious" invasion of the plaintiff's right. Id. at 66,865 P.2d at 675,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877.
By so doing, a defendant can thus defeat the plaintiff's reasonable expectation by giving
notice of such intent. Id. Under the third element, the defendant does not need to justify
its conduct unless the plaintiff establishes that the defendant has infringed upon constitu-
tionally protected interests and the invasion is sufficiently serious in nature, scope, or im-
pact. Id. at 68, 865 P.2d at 676, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 878.
565. Id at 37, 865 P.2d at 655, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
566. Id at 38, 865 P.2d at 656, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857,
567. See supra part ll.D.1.
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est.568 The context of the decision, however, was quite different and
involved nongovernmental action;5 69 thus, the application of the Cali-
fornia analysis in the abortion context is unclear.
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren570 came to the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal for review after the California Supreme
Court's decision in Hill and after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Casey. The court revisited the constitutionality of a statute that pro-
hibited an unemancipated minor from obtaining-subject to a judicial
bypass-an abortion without first having obtained the written consent
of one of her parents or a legal guardian.571
In the original case, Academy 1,572 the court of appeal affirmed
the order granting a preliminary injunction. 73 It held that even if the
federal right of privacy would not inalidate California's parental con-
sent statute, it must be tested against the right of privacy guaranteed
under the California Constitution. 74
568. See supra part II.D.
569. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 15-16, 865 P.2d at 641, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at-842.
570. 26 Cal. App. 4th 479, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, review granted, 882 P.2d 247, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 556 (1994) [hereinafter Academy II].
571. Id at 486-87, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 548 (citing A.B. 2274 (Act of Sept. 27, 1987, ch.
1237, § 2, 1987 Cal. Stat. 122,510 (codified at CAL. Civ. CODE § 34.5 (West 1982), repealed
and recodified at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6920, 6921, 6925 (West 1994)) and Act of Sept. 27,
1987, ch. 1237, § 3, 1987 Cal. Stat. 122,510 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25958 (West Supp. 1995)))).
. 572. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de' Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 263 Cal.
Rptr. 46 (1989). The original case was heard pre-Hill and pre-Casey.
573. Academy 11, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 489, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550.
574. Id. at 488, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549. The court found that
the right of privacy is a fundamental right [under the California Constitution], and
the ability to choose whether or not to give birth and whether or not to undergo
procedures relevant to that choice are among the most fundamental and intimate
aspects of that right. [The court] concluded that the right of privacy, including the
right to choose whether to give birth or to terminate a pregnancy, therefore, may
not be burdened absent a compelling state interest.
Id., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550. The court thus concluded that it was the state's burden to show
(1) that the invasion of privacy rights was justified by some compelling state inter-
est..., (2) that the statute's disparate treatment of like-situated minors, a at
488-89,32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549 (noting that the statute did not purport to regulate
minors making other medical choices, including decision to carry pregnancy to
term), was necessary to the furtherance of that interest, and (3) that the interest
could not be furthered by other means less harmful to the fundamental right.
Id. The court remanded to the superior court for resolution of the issues that depended, at
least in part, upon factual determinations. Id. at 490, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550.
On remand the superior court determined that the legislation did burden the right to
privacy, and that the state had failed to show-that the state's interest justified the burden-
even though the court recognized the state interests at issue as "compelling." Id. The
court identified compelling state interests as follows: (1) the state's interest in the medical,
emotional, and psychological welfare of minors; (2) the state's interest in reducing the
teenage pregnancy rate; and (3) the state's interest in preserving and fostering the parent-
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In Academy 11, on its own review of the evidence, the court af-
firmed the superior court's conclusion that the legislation burdened
the right to privacy and the state had failed to show that the burden
was justified by the state's interests. 7 "The evidence not only sup-
ports the superior court's conclusion, it mandates it."5 7 6
The court rejected the state's invitation to review the case under
Hill's reformulated privacy analysis and contended it would not affect
its conclusions. 577 The court recognized the right to choose abortion
as an "exceedingly fundamental privacy interest, ' 78 one in which mi-
nors have a reasonable expectation of privacy-even if the expecta-
tion is slightly less than an adult's expectation.579 The intrusion, in the
court's view was substantial; "a serious invasion of the right to make
that choice [to have an abortion] in private. '580
The court held that the state might have defended against plain-
tiff's prima facie case by showing that (1) the conditions imposed re-
lated to the purposes of the legislation; (2) the utility of the conditions
outweighed the impairment of constitutional rights; and (3) there
were no less offensive alternatives available to achieve the state's ob-
jective.5 1 The court held that the burden on those issues had been
correctly placed on the state, and that the state had failed to meet that
burden.5s
The state also argued that it was improper-and unnecessary-
for the lower court to consider factual evidence in a facial challenge
context.583 The state maintained that, in a facial challenge, it need
only show that the statute was designed to further a compelling state
interest, that the legislature could rationally believe that the law fur-
thered a compelling interest, and that evidence on this point was inap-
child relationship. Id. "The evidence was nothing less than overwhelming that the legisla-
tion would not protect these interests, and would in fact injure the asserted interests of the
health of minors and the parent-child relationship." Id.
575. Id. at 490, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550-51.
576. Id, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550.
577. Under California's "rule of law" doctrine, the rule of law necessary to a decision
"'"conclusively establishes that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of the same
parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case."' " Id. at 491, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 551 (quoting Nally v. Grace Community Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 301-02, 763 P.2d 948,
962, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 111 (1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989) (quoting 9 B.E.
Wrru N, CAuiomRNA PROCEDURE § 737, at 705-07 (3d ed. 1985))).
578. Id at 496, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554.
579. Id. at 496-97, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555.
580. Id. at 497, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555.
581. Id. at 498, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 499, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556-57.
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propriate.5 4 The court rejected this contention: "When legislation
invades a fundamental right, the courts have the duty to look behind
any legislative finding and independently determine whether the par-
ticular invasion is justified. '58
5
At this point, the court's analysis paralleled the undue burden
standard as articulated in Casey. Referring to Casey, but relying
largely on California case law, the court articulated the analysis:
[The court] must first consider the character and magnitude
of the asserted injury to the rights.., that the plaintiff seeks
to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court
must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each
of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's
rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing
court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision
is unconstitutional
586
In some circumstances, the court need only consider the face of
the statute; in others, the court must engage in factual analysis on the
question of whether the legislation justifies the burden.58 The Cali-
fornia court thus articulated a yery similar-albeit somewhat more
structured-standard of review under the California Constitution, but
reached a different conclusion, striking down a parental consent provi-
sion very similar to that upheld by the Casey Court. 88
The court identified the state interests at issue: the health and
welfare of minors and the interest of the state in fostering parent-child
relationships. The court also required a further showing by the state
that the legislation would in fact further the proffered interest-a
showing the state failed to make on this record.589 The court then
balanced the interest of the state against the privacy interests of the
child and the impact of the intrusion, and concluded that the state
constitution protects a child's liberty interests.590 The court concluded
584. Id
585. Id. at 500, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557.
586. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
587. Id. (citing Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2826-27).
588. See supra part II.E.4.
589. Academy II, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 501-02, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 558.
590. Id. at 502-03, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 558-59. The court suggests that the federal consti-
tution concludes that a child's right to privacy exceeds a parent's right to be involved in the
abortion decision. Id at 502, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559. Consequently, federal law may be
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that, under the lower intrusion threshold of the California Constitu-
tion, the state purposes did not justify the burdens imposed. 591
The most notable feature of the California decision is the court's
effort to "fill out" the boundaries of the undue burden standard, albeit
in the context of California law. The court's logic and analysis are
instructive; it articulated the ingredients in analyzing the state's inter-
ests and it clarified the process of assessing impact. Even if the
threshold determination for "undue burden" is different under the
federal and state constitutions, the analysis conducted by the Califor-
nia court may be a useful option in defining the boundaries of the
undue burden test.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a plurality of the Supreme Court
- presented a new standard by which to measure restrictions on a wo-
man's right to choose abortion. The Casey undue burden test requires
a fluid weighing of purpose and effect-a clear departure from Roe's
trimester hierarchy which struck down virtually all regulations re-
stricting abortion imposed during the first two trimesters. In addition,
the plurality impliedly overthrew the facial challenge standard, at least
in abortion cases, by reviewing the facts on the record to determine if
the law was unconstitutional in a large fraction of the cases in which
the law was relevant. The Court's analysis represents a clear depar-
ture from the Salerno test under which there must be no set of circum-
stances where the law can be constitutionally applied.
As such, Casey demands much more from the lower federal and
state courts. For example, a court faced with an abortion restriction
may no longer simply look to the Supreme Court's Roe decision and
invalidate a regulation if it restricts the abortion right in the first two
trimesters. Instead the court must look at the state purpose and con-
firm that it is a legitimate one. Then, in accordance with the legiti-
macy of the purpose, it is required to look at the facts on the record
before it, perhaps adding its own commonsense understanding, and
determine if the regulation would be a substantial obstacle to the wo-
men for whom the law is most relevant.The Casey test, of course, raises the possibility that similar abor-
tion provisions will be invalidated in State X and yet be held constitu-
upheld only if it affords a mechanism which allows the minor to obtain an abortion without
parental notice or consent. Id. (citations omitted).
591. Id. at 502-03, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559.
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tional in State Y, based on the legislative purpose or circumstances
particular to State X which may make application of the provision
more burdensome there. Casey further removes the safety net from
state judges, most of whom are accountable to the electorate. No
longer can they maintain that Supreme Court precedent compels a
given ruling on the statute before them.
The facial challenge standard has, of course, become the primary
issue for the courts interpreting Casey. Most courts have recognized
that what the Casey plurality did was not consistent with Salerno. But
in the absence of any explicit direction as to whether the Court inten-
tionally altered the test or whether it was a one-time, do-as-we-say-
not-as-we-do exercise, the state and lower federal courts have gener-
ally refused to recognize that any change has occurred. This reticence
has perhaps been best borne out in the exchange between Justices
Scalia and O'Connor in the memorandum opinions filed in Ada and
Fargo II, respectively. Justice Scalia brought the facial challenge stan-
dard issue directly into question in Ada. Only Justice Souter joined
Justice O'Connor in responding, in Fargo II, that Casey had, in fact,
intended to alter the facial challenge test.
Only a few courts have taken the Supreme Court at face value
and addressed whether the undue burden test is truly a test of general
application. Though the one lower court to have engaged in a full
undue burden analysis for a nonabortion right of privacy case was
overruled, the possibility remains that Casey could broadly apply to
all privacy rights cases.
In the end, though, perhaps the clearest lesson of Casey is that
what the Supreme Court declares the law is, and what the law is in
practice, are two different things. Many lower courts, faced with the
ambiguous undue burden test and an unspecified facial challenge stan-
dard have run for the safety of the old hard-and-fast Salerno standard
for facial challenges, a standard which invariably results in upholding
the statute. Others resort to state constitutional tests, thereby avoid-
ing Casey entirely.
The future of Casey's undue burden and facial challenge stan-
dards is uncertain. Abortion remains a hot-button topic, and some
states are already experimenting with increasingly restrictive abortion
regulations, testing the limits of Casey's undue burden standard. Yet
the undue burden test theoretically allows each court to engage in a
fact-specific analysis and more freedom to come to different conclu-
sions about the constitutionality of identical abortion restrictions-
different even than the Court's conclusions in Casey. And even with
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the confusion in the lower courts as to how Casey's undue burden and
facial challenge standards work, the Supreme Court may simply de-
cide that it is politically expedient to refuse to grant certiorari on an-
other abortion case anytime soon-particularly if no viewpoint can
muster the votes needed to hand down a clearer statement of the law.
In the meantime, lower courts might continue to expand the applica-
tion of Casey to other nonabortion privacy rights cases. Other courts
may continue to ignore Casey's facial challenge standard in favor of
Salerno because the Casey Court set forth its new standards in such a
splintered opinion. And, in the end, con law is as con law does.
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